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 ABSTRACT 
 
Fernando Ribas Chaddad 
 
AGENCY THEORY, POTENTIAL FOR OPERATIONAL  
ENGINEERING AND BUYOUT ACTIVITY 
 
(Under the direction of Professor Richard Bettis) 
 
This corporate governance study investigates the relationships among agency 
theory, potential for operational engineering and firm underperformance. The empirical 
setting is a set of PE (private equity) buyouts in the US from 1998 to 2007, building on 
earlier research on LBOs (leveraged buyouts). I employ direct measures of agency costs 
to test Jensen’s (1986) free cash flows proposition as well as a new proposition by 
Kaplan (2007), according to whom potential for operational engineering is a predictor of 
buyout activity in addition to agency conditions. I control for competing risks with a Cox 
proportional hazards model. My evidence fails to lend strong support for either 
proposition as an antecedent of buyout activity (direct effects). Finally, I find that, in the 
context of high asset inefficiencies (high potential for operational engineering) and high 
board independence, the probability of buyout activity is decreased.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Firm performance is the central focus of strategic management research 
(Schendel and Hofer, 1979). The broad question of why firms underperform has been 
examined in strategic management from several theoretical perspectives, including 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to agency theorists, firms 
underperform due to the separation of ownership and control and the resulting 
misalignment of interests between shareholders (principals) and management (agents). 
To resolve this problem, agency theorists prescribe the redesign of managerial 
incentives in the form of pay-for-performance compensation that induces managers to 
focus on shareholder value, and a more concentrated ownership structure as fewer 
active shareholders with higher equity stakes are more apt to effectively monitor 
management and curb opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Following redesigned managerial incentives and closer board monitoring, the firm is 
expected to perform to optimal. Kaplan (2007) refers to these agency-related remedies 
as governance engineering. 
However, governance engineering may not always fully solve the problem of 
underperformance for at least two reasons (e.g., Hendry, 2002). The first reason is 
associated with the specification of objectives, known as multitasking (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991). When a principal’s goals are complex and multidimensional and 
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therefore difficult to capture in an outcome-based contract, attempts to specify 
outcomes may be dysfunctional, as agents will perform to the specific terms linked to 
incentives, rather than in the more general interests of their principals. The second 
reason is honest incompetence (Hendry, 2002) by the firm’s management team. In 
agency theory, managers are assumed to be competent and always able to achieve 
desired outcomes provided incentives are in place.  
Yet, in empirical research, the competence of individuals is not guaranteed 
given bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) and limitations of rational understanding and 
communication arising from language, culture, and cognition (e.g., Simon, 1991). In 
situations in which agents are called upon to exercise judgment, or in which the 
achievement of goals depends on cooperative efforts involving other people, outcomes 
are not guaranteed regardless of the effort applied (Nilikant and Rao, 1994). The issues 
of honest incompetence and multitasking may be reduced via advice in the form of 
mentoring and guidance (Hendry, 2002). Principals may dedicate effort not to monitor 
for opportunism, but to help agents develop their technical competence via the transfer 
of skills or to improve the agents’ understanding of goals beyond those specified 
contractually – including circumstances, values, and the broader priorities of principals. 
Relatedly, the offering of advice to management has been often reported as one of the 
key duties of boards of directors (e.g., Mace, 1971; Carter and Lorsch, 2004).  
An underlying assumption of such an advisory role is that principals must have 
industry-specific knowledge, operating expertise or expert networks deep enough to be 
considered areas of valuable advice to agents. Such valuable knowledge possessed by 
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principals may manifest themselves in the capacity for operational engineering 
(Kaplan, 2007). Potential for operational engineering (POE) refers to the degree to 
which a firm’s operational inefficiency is higher than the competition’s, and therefore 
could be improved. The implication is that principals must know how to identify and 
act upon potential for operational engineering in order to be capable of providing 
valuable advice to agents. If this line of reasoning is correct, then firms in which 
principals and agents implement governance engineering (via redesigned incentives and 
closer monitoring) and operational engineering (enabled by the advisory role of capable 
principals) at the same time should be least likely to underperform.  
It is noteworthy that operational engineering and governance engineering 
embody overlapping yet different concepts. They overlap as their absence may lead to 
similar consequences (underperformance), yet they differ as not all firms with high 
potential for operational engineering suffer from high agency costs. As an example, 
there is no separation of ownership and control in a founder-owned and managed firm, 
yet this firm may underperform even in the presence of profit-maximizing goals as a 
consequence of honest managerial incompetence. 
The empirical setting chosen to examine governance engineering and 
operational engineering is buyouts. Buyouts constitute an ideal setting where 
governance engineering is always present, and yet the presence of operational 
engineering has been disputed as will be explained in detail below. Buyouts are defined 
as going-private transactions, in which a financial acquirer (or a group of investors led 
by a financial acquirer) in the form of a private equity partnership purchases the 
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controlling equity stake in a publicly-traded target, usually with debt financing. This 
transaction results in the formation of a new privately-held firm with a typically high 
debt-to-equity ratio, and whose equity is closely held by a small group of large outside 
investors (including the lead financial acquirer) and a group of managers with high-
powered incentives. Thus, buyouts represent a clear-cut example of governance 
engineering (Kaplan, 2007). Further, the extent to which operational engineering 
opportunities may be found in buyouts has been the subject of debate (e.g., Rappaport, 
1990; Fox and Marcus, 1992). Previously, buyouts were referred to as LBOs (leveraged 
buyouts) and were considered one of the most controversial features of the US takeover 
boom of the 1980s (Wiersema and Liebeskind, 1995). By the 2000s, buyouts were 
referred to as PE (private equity) buyouts.  
Buyouts were the focus of a series of empirical studies on the 1980s’ LBO wave 
in the US (e.g., Kaplan, 1989; Singh, 1990; Liebeskind, Wiersema and Hansen, 1992; 
Long and Ravenscraft, 1993a, 1993b; Phan and Hill, 1995; Wieserma and Liebeskind, 
1995). Building on this rich research stream, scholars have started to examine the more 
recent buyout wave that gained momentum in the 2000s. Kaplan (2007) argues that one 
of the key differences between 1980s’ LBOs and recent PE buyouts is that LBOs is 
aimed to focus solely on governance engineering, whereas PE buyouts are about 
operational engineering in addition to governance engineering. An implication of this 
argument is that, whereas agency proxies were found to be key drivers of buyout 
activity in the 1980s (Singh, 1990; Opler and Titman, 1993), an additional predictor in 
the form of potential for operational engineering must be considered in the examination 
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of the antecedents of recent buyouts. At the heart of this argument are the dramatic 
changes in US corporate governance since the 1980s, as explained in detail below.  
In this study, I examine the interplay between governance engineering and 
operational engineering in the context of buyouts. In doing so, I aim to address two 
questions associated with the antecedents of buyout activity. First, whereas the agency 
costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986) have been proposed as one of the key drivers of 
buyout activity, prior work (e.g., Singh, 1990; Opler and Titman, 1993) has relied on 
proxies rather than direct measures of agency costs which gauge a firm’s potential for 
governance engineering. In this study, I offer a more direct test of this agency-related 
argument by using measures such as board independence, CEO duality and insider 
equity ownership to predict buyout activity. The second question I aim to address with 
this study centers on Kaplan’s (2007) proposition on operational engineering, which 
has yet to be empirically tested. I thus examine the antecedents of PE buyouts, testing 
Kaplan’s (2007) proposition while controlling for governance-related antecedents. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I start with a brief 
review of the background theory, including corporate governance, agency theory, the 
role of buyouts, and the concept of potential for operational engineering (POE). Next, I 
develop a set of hypotheses in the context of extant literature. I then offer a methods 
section that includes a description of my sample, the statistical technique employed, 
variables and measurements. Next, I present results of my empirical analysis, including 
descriptive statistics, results from the event history analysis, and several robustness 
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checks. Finally, I conclude with a discussion section which includes contributions, 
implications for theory and practice, limitations and future research directions.  
 7
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND THEORY 
Given this paper’s goal to investigate the relationships among corporate 
governance, potential for operational engineering and firm underperformance in the 
empirical setting of buyouts, I start with a brief review of the corporate governance 
literature (in which agency theory is the dominant paradigm) to summarize the 
governance engineering argument. I then extent this rich research stream to explain 
how the argument for operational engineering may complement governance 
engineering to explain firm underperformance in general, and in the context of buyouts 
in specific. 
2.1. Governance Engineering 
The argument for governance engineering can be traced back to Berle and 
Means (1932), who identified problems arising from the separation of ownership and 
control in large, listed (publicly-traded) firms and argued that management ownership 
in such firms is too small to make managers interested in profit maximization. This is 
the incentive-intensity argument also explored by Baumol (1959), Marris (1964) and 
Williamson (1964), according to whom managers have a natural incentive to increase 
firm size rather than to focus on profitability. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama 
and Jensen (1983) developed this argument further into a complete theory which 
became the subject of extensive empirical examination. Agency theory has then 
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become the predominant theoretical paradigm in corporate governance research (e.g., 
Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003).  
2.1.1. Corporate Governance and Agency Theory 
According to agency theorists (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the separation 
of ownership and control in the modern corporation evidences two distinct entities with 
different interests and risk profiles: management (agents) and shareholders (principals). 
While shareholders may diversify risks by investing in multiple firms, management is 
tied to a single organization by virtue of their position (Fama, 1980). This difference in 
risk profiles means that management and shareholders operate under different sets of 
incentives. Jensen and Meckling define an agency relationship as “a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal[s]) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent” (1976:308). However, it is difficult to specify ex ante contracts 
that accommodate all possible future contingencies (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Agency theorists make the explicit assumption of self-interested individuals (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) prone to opportunism. From a shareholder’s perspective, this may 
lead to inefficient managerial behavior, such as: making short-term, risk-averse 
investments (Lambert and Larcker, 1985); empire-building (Amihud and Lev, 1981); 
shirking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); exploiting managerial perks (Williamson, 1985); 
and ‘the quiet life’ (e.g., Stein, 2003).  
To agency theorists, the corporation’s board of directors is the primary 
monitoring device aimed at protecting shareholder interests and alleviating potential 
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agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency 
theorists posit that the primary responsibility of the board of directors is to ensure that 
management actions are consistent with shareholder interests (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, the board acts to separate decision management 
from decision control, keeping for itself the roles of ratification and monitoring (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Additionally, boards of directors also influence firm performance by 
reducing agency costs arising from noncompliance by management with established 
goals and procedures, by articulating shareholder objectives, and by focusing the 
attention of management on performance (Mizruchi, 1983).  
However, severe limitations to the degree of discretion conferred to boards of 
directors have been widely documented (e.g., Mace, 1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) 
even more recently (e.g., Carter and Lorsch, 2004). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) 
note that boards are not always effective monitors of management, and conclude that 
the underlying reason relates to the balance of power in the boardroom, which tends to 
shift toward the dominant CEO (e.g., Kosnik, 1987). Further, Kerr and Bettis (1987) 
show that boards often do not honor their fiduciary duties.  
Corporate governance controls may be internal or external to the firm. Walsh 
and Seward (1990) argue that boards of directors have two classes of internal controls 
available: the adjustment of incentives, and dismissal. In case of failure of these internal 
control mechanisms available to boards, the market for corporate control is supposed to 
serve as an external mechanism and the discipline of last resort (Manne, 1965; Fama, 
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1980). However, external controls may also fail given a host of external entrenchment 
practices available to astute, opportunistic management (Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
2.1.2. The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flows 
Corporate governance scholars disagree on the effectiveness of the existing 
mechanisms in the United States (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Easterbrook and Fischel 
(1991) offer an optimistic assessment of the US corporate governance system, whilst 
Jensen (1989; 1993) argues that US listed corporations embody deeply flawed 
governance mechanisms. According to Jensen (1986), one of the reasons why 
governance mechanisms in the US are flawed is the agency costs of free cash flows.  
Jensen defines free cash flow (FCF) as “cash flow in excess of that required to 
fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant 
cost of capital” (1986:323). Noting that conflicts of interest between principals and 
agents over payout policies are especially severe when the organization generates 
substantial free cash flows, Jensen (1986) examines the problem of how to motivate 
managers to disgorge cash in lieu of investing it in projects yielding returns lower than 
the cost of capital, or wasting it on other organizational inefficiencies. An underlying 
assumption is that free cash flows may allow corporate management (agents) to finance 
low-return or even negative-return projects, which would otherwise not be funded via 
external sources such as the equity or bond markets. FCF theory implies management 
in firms with unused borrowing power and large free cash flows are more likely to 
undertake low-benefit or even value-destroying projects. In order to test FCF 
propositions, Jensen (1986) examined the US oil industry, which had earned substantial 
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free cash flows in the 1970s and the early 1980s in the aftermath of substantial 
increases in oil prices. The author found that, consistent with the agency costs of free 
cash flow, managers in the US oil industry did not pay out excess cash to shareholders. 
Instead, they continued to spend heavily on activities such as exploration and 
development in the 1980s as oil prices collapsed, even though average returns were 
below the cost of capital. 
As a potential solution available to firms with severe agency costs of free cash 
flow, Jensen (1986) offered debt. Specifically, “levering the firm so highly that it 
cannot continue to exist in its old form generates benefits. It creates the crisis to 
motivate cuts in expansion programs and the sale of those divisions which are more 
valuable outside the firm. The proceeds are used to reduce debt to a more normal or 
permanent level. This process results in a complete rethinking of the organization’s 
strategy and its structure. When successful, a much leaner and competitive organization 
results” (1986:328-329).  
The leveraged buyout (LBO) wave that swept the US in the 1980s was in line 
with this reasoning. By taking the buyout target out of public ownership and into 
private hands with high levels of debt, LBO firms (acquirers) expected to reduce 
agency costs and deliver superior performance in the buyout target. Following the LBO 
wave of the 1980s, Jensen (1989) predicted the eclipse of the public corporation and its 
replacement by superior governance structures such as LBOs, which were associated 
with lower agency costs of free cash flow as a consequence of more aggressive 
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executive pay as well as a closer monitoring of management actions by a small but 
powerful board of directors (Gupta and Rosenthal, 1991). 
2.2. Operational Engineering 
Kaplan (2007) argues that, whereas governance engineering is a key antecedent 
of buyouts, an additional antecedent in the form of potential for operational engineering 
must be considered. At the heart of this argument are the profound changes in US 
corporate governance since the 1980s as synthesized by Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001).  
2.2.1. Internal Control Mechanisms 
Internal control mechanisms in US corporations were mostly inactive until the 
1970s. Descriptive work on boards of directors tracking back to Mace (1971), Vance 
(1983) and Whisler (1984) described boards of directors as passive groups of 
individuals, therefore establishing a considerable gap between what the laws stated 
boards of directors should do, and what boards actually did. Typical board meetings in 
the 1960s and 1970s were not regarded as a proper forum for the discussion of issues 
raised by challenging questions. Mace (1971) and Whisler (1984) pointed to the 
existence of a tacit code of conduct in the boardroom, in which professional courtesy 
and corporate good manners suggested that embarrassing questions should not be 
asked, especially if some of the CEOs subordinates were inside directors. 
Consequently, any doubts or concerns about policies, operations, or management 
decisions were typically expressed to the CEO outside board meetings, unless the 
outside director was prepared to resign. Abrasive questions risked being interpreted as a 
vote of no-confidence in the CEO, and thus were very rarely asked. This description of 
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typical board behavior in the 1960s and 1970s is consistent with the conclusions offered 
by Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), according to whom corporate managements then 
tended to be loyal to the corporation rather than to shareholders, focusing on growth 
rather than shareholder returns. Relatedly, boards tended to be passive and the use of 
incentive pay by corporate management was limited (Lorsch and McIver, 1989).  
After the 1980s LBO wave, however, the use of internal control mechanisms 
changed significantly in US corporations. First, CEO compensation increased by a 
factor of six from the 1980s to the 2000s, with a disproportionate increase in equity-
based pay. This increase in equity-based compensation led to a hike in CEO pay-to-
performance sensitivities by a factor of more than ten times from 1980 to 1999 
(Holderness et al., 1999). Second, changes in boards of directors were mandated in the 
US by new legislation in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. A key board-
related change was the increased power, responsibility, and independence of the listed 
firms’ audit committee. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) argued that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act strengthened internal corporate governance mechanisms of listed firms by affecting 
board behavior, which became more exposed to pressure to more aggressively monitor 
management. As a consequence, many US corporations hired board consultants to help 
implement best practices after the passage of Sarbanes Oxley (Carter and Lorsch, 
2004).  
2.2.2. External Control Mechanisms 
External control mechanisms also became more robust since the 1980s 
(Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003). Donaldson (1994) described the rise of shareholder 
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activism as institutional investors with high ownership stakes publicly state their high 
expectations with regards to shareholder returns. In addition, the revolution in 
information technology enabled a faster dissemination of information in capital 
markets, facilitating the work of institutional investors and also allowing smaller 
shareholders to cast votes of no-confidence by selling shares when in disapproval of 
corporate management. Kaplan (1997) noted that the resurgence of general takeover 
activity in the 1990s was evidence that the market for corporate control proposed by 
Fama (1980) was as active as ever.  
Kaplan also argued that LBOs did not reappear in the 1990s because “we are all 
[KKR’s] Henry Kravis now” (1997:2), explaining that shareholders, managers and 
boards by then applied the insights and strengths of 1980s’ LBOs, including closer 
board monitoring and more aggressive managerial incentives. If this argument is valid, 
then buyouts will not reappear in the US because corporations do not need to complete 
buyouts in order to implement governance engineering. From the early 2000s onwards, 
however, buyout activity in the US increased sharply despite the presence of 
significantly more robust mechanisms of corporate governance in place. If this 
resurgence cannot be explained by governance engineering alone, then the question that 
follows is what else may explain it.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Buyouts are a longstanding feature of US financial markets as well as corporate 
governance, and can be traced back to the first half of the 20th century, when aggressive 
financiers took control of target firms via financial transactions then called bootstraps 
(Rickertsen, 2001). Many early buyouts considered as milestone transactions were 
hostile in nature, such as Victor Posner’s takeover of Sharon Steel in 1969. In the 
1980s, buyouts gained much media attention in the US under the label of LBO 
(leveraged buyout). Following the boom-and-bust cycle of the 1980s, buyouts remained 
somehow subdued in the US throughout much of the 1990s. By the early 2000s, 
buyouts resurfaced and then attracted intense media attention again, this time under the 
PE (private equity) label. Like the 1980s LBO wave, the PE buyout boom in the US 
turned into a bust following the 2007 credit crunch in US financial markets. 
3.1. The 1980s’ Leveraged Buyout (LBO) Wave 
As noted, buyouts predate the 1980s but did not attract the interest of corporate 
governance scholars before the phenomenon grew in importance as “the $3 million 
buyout of the mid 1970s [was] replaced by the $1 billion buyout of the mid 1980s” 
(Lowenstein, 1985:735). 1980s’ LBOs were transactions in which the shareholders of a 
listed firm are bought out by a new group of investors – usually including incumbent 
management, a specialized buyout firm, commercial banks and public debt holders. 
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With aggressive compensation arrangements, management typically increased their 
percentage stake in the buyout company, even though they actually extracted a certain 
dollar amount of their previous stake in the pre-buyout firm (Kaplan and Stein, 1993). 
Whereas the acquiring firm typically bought enough equity to secure control in the 
buyout target, most of the remaining financing was in the form of debt (usually 
provided by commercial banks) and high-yield subordinated public debt, also known as 
junk bonds in the 1980s. The use of significant leverage (debt) differentiated LBOs 
from other types of buyouts. 
1980s’ LBOs became central to what was then the greatest M&A wave in US 
history. Between 1981 and 1989, more than 2400 listed corporations with a market 
value of around $300 billion unadjusted for inflation underwent an LBO (Wiersema 
and Liebeskind, 1995). Typical LBOs then featured debt-to-capital ratios exceeding 
85%, and shareholder premia exceeding 40% (Kaplan, 1991). By the late 1980s, some 
of the largest companies in the US were being targeted by buyout firms. High-profile 
1980s’ LBOs included RJR Nabisco, Southland, H.R. Macy and Trans World Airlines 
– all of which were amongst the top 20 companies of the 1990 Forbes Rank (Opler, 
1992).  
The 1980s’ LBO wave culminated with the RJR Nabisco buyout in 1989 for a 
then record $24.8 billion unadjusted for inflation. By the early 1990s, the LBO boom 
became a bust as buyout activity collapsed due several factors including anti-takeover 
legislation and jurisprudence; overt political pressure against leverage; the collapse of 
the junk bond market; and a credit crunch (Jensen, 1991; Comment and Schwert, 1995). 
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In sum, the LBO wave of the 1980s was considered one of the most controversial 
business phenomena of the 1980s (Wiersema and Liebeskind, 1995) given its highly 
asymmetrical impact on firm stakeholders (Rappaport, 1990; Fox and Marcus, 1992; 
Shleifer and Summers, 1988) and the controversy that followed. Bhagat, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1990) stated that the main purpose of LBOs in the 1980s was to serve as a 
temporary financing tool for the implementation of drastic short-run improvements 
such as divestitures. Firm stakeholders that were apt to be affected negatively in the 
aftermath of LBOs included employees (who risked being dismissed or witnessing pay 
or benefit cuts), the government (which would experience a decrease in corporate tax 
revenues) and bondholders (whose holdings would plummet in value given higher 
leverage and lower ratings in the buyout target following the LBO). The generally 
negative press coverage that followed is illustrated in Figure 1. 
In addition to the controversy arising from asymmetric outcomes from the 
perspective of stakeholders, another controversial aspect was that LBOs usually 
constituted a temporary ownership and governance structure, as the acquirer (buyout 
firm) typically sold the buyout target after a limited period of time. Buyout firms 
typically count on one of four exit strategies in order to reach liquidity (Rickertsen, 
2001): take the buyout target public again, in what is referred to as reverse buyouts; sell 
the buyout target to a strategic buyer; sell the buyout target to another buyout firm in 
what is known as a secondary deal; or issue new debt in exchange for the equity of 
exiting investors. Kaplan (1991) examined the question of whether buyouts are 
permanent organizations, or whether they return to public ownership via IPO’s (initial 
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public offerings). The author found that the median firm goes public again within five 
to six years after the buyout, suggesting that LBOs embody a temporary ownership 
structure. 
3.1.1. Antecedents of 1980s’ LBOs 
LBOs were the focus of a series of studies following the intense buyout activity 
in the 1980s (e.g., Kaplan, 1989; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Singh, 1990; Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990; Palepu, 1990; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991; 
Liebeskind, Wiersema and Hansen, 1992; Opler, 1992; Kaplan and Stein, 1993; Long 
and Ravenscraft, 1993a, 1993b; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994; Phan and Hill, 1995; 
Wiersema and Liebeskind, 1995). Scholars offered theoretical arguments and 
empirically tested at least four potential explanations for 1980s’ LBOs as Table 1 
shows.  
The first potential explanation for 1980s’ LBOs was Jensen’s (1986, 1989, 
1991, 1993) free cash flow (FCF) argument. According to FCF theory, LBOs occurred 
as a consequence of cash flows that were invested in value-destroying projects rather 
than returned to shareholders in the form of dividends. Kaplan (1997) noted that, if this 
argument were correct, then firms should cut capital expenditures in the aftermath of 
LBOs. Yet, the evidence for this assertion was mixed. Whereas Kaplan (1989) and 
Kaplan and Stein (1993) found evidence in support of FCF theory, Servaes (1994) 
found the opposite. 
A second, potential explanation for 1980s’ LBOs was the shareholder 
disappointment with conglomerates, and the resulting shift away from unsuccessful 
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diversification efforts and the return to specialization. Shleifer and Vishny (1990) 
argued that many corporations had embarked into unrelated diversification in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and that these corporations could create shareholder value by becoming less 
diversified in the 1980s. This argument was also in line with Jensen (1986) and his 
influential work on free cash flow theory, as Jensen (1986) argued that diversification 
was more likely to destroy than to create value. However, Kaplan (1997) noted that the 
empirical evidence in support of this argument was mixed, arguing that, whereas US 
corporations became less diversified in the 1980s, this decrease did not seem 
significantly large (e.g., Montgomery, 1994; Liebeskind and Opler, 1994).  
Several scholars (e.g. Donaldson, 1994; Singh, 1990; Fox and Marcus, 1992) 
argued that a third potential explanation for 1980s’ LBOs was firm undervaluation. 
Donaldson (1994) explained that the rise of institutional shareholders and the greater 
availability of information enabled by information technology in capital markets 
increased the pressure to maximize shareholder value. Donaldson (1994) referred to the 
1980s as the decade of confrontation. Kaplan (1997) argued that the undervaluation 
argument was the most convincing explanation for the 1980s’ LBO wave. 
A fourth potential explanation was offered and tested by Opler and Titman 
(1993), who combined Jensen’s (1986) FCF argument and the undervaluation argument 
to explain LBO activity. In their empirical tests, the authors found that the firms most 
likely to become LBO targets were the ones that combined high cash flows with 
unfavorable investment opportunities in the form of Tobin’s Q. The authors reasoned 
that it was the interaction of high potential to waste investments in value-destroying 
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projects (in the form of high free cash flows) and few investment opportunities (in the 
form of Tobin’s Q) that explained LBO activity.  
Prior work in strategic management (Singh, 1990) and corporate finance (Opler 
and Titman, 1993) empirically tested several potential explanations for 1980s’ LBOs. 
Table 2 offers a comparison of the present study with the work by Singh (1990) and 
Opler and Titman (1993). As will be explained in detail below, the present study builds 
on extant literature to examine the antecedents of present-day buyout activity by 
applying more direct measures of agency costs (governance engineering) and testing 
new theory of buyouts (operational engineering following Kaplan, 2007) while offering 
a methodological approach that accommodates controls for sample selection bias and 
competing risks in the form of Cox regression models. 
3.1.2. Consequences of the 1980s’ LBOs Wave 
As consequences of the 1980s’ LBO wave, scholars studied the impact of LBOs 
on the buyout targets’ operational performance (e.g., Kaplan, 1989; Long and 
Ravenscraft, 1993a), the buyout targets’ diversification policies (e.g., Wiersema and 
Liebeskind, 1995), and changes in governance structure in the buyout target after the 
LBO (e.g., Singh, 1990). From a theoretical standpoint, many of these LBO studies 
drew from the agency costs of FCF to examine LBOs. Whereas many scholars (e.g., 
Kaplan, 1991; Jensen, 1993) argued that LBOs addressed agency problems, others (e.g., 
Rappaport, 1990; Fox and Marcus, 1992) questioned the viability of LBOs as a durable 
governance form given its adverse impact on firm stakeholders other than shareholders. 
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3.2. The Private Equity (PE) Buyout Cycle 
As noted, buyout activity resurfaced again in the early 2000s under a new label: 
private equity (PE) buyouts. Rickertsen (2001) argued that this re-labeling was a 
reaction by buyout firms to the negative press that followed polemical LBO 
transactions in the late 1980s, when up to a third of all buyouts eventually led to 
distressed outcomes such as restructurings or even bankruptcies (Kaplan, 1997).  
According to figures from Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Company 
(SDC), the PE buyout boom of the 2000s came into existence as the total transaction 
value of US buyouts increased sharply from $22 billion in 2001 to $353 billion in 2006. 
By mid 2006, more than 250 US firms in the booming buyouts industry controlled 
some $800 billion in capital, and observers noted that these buyout firms were 
preparing for more. Writers at Buyouts magazine estimated that nearly $175 billion of 
new money flowed into US buyout firms in 2005 alone (The Wall Street Journal, 
2006). Similar to what was observed in the 1980s, the average size of a PE buyout 
transaction dramatically increased as the phenomenon gathered momentum. Some 
high-profile PE buyouts in the US included Chrysler, Toys-R-Us, Neiman Marcus, 
Hertz and La Quinta Inn. In 2007, the Blackstone Group announced the buyout of 
Equity Office Properties Trust for $36 billion, breaking KKR’s longstanding record set 
in 1989 with the RJR Nabisco transaction. The impact of buyouts on US business was 
by then quite significant, as an estimated 1/25th of the entire US economy (Hubbard, 
2007) as well as 6 million workers representing around 2% of the entire US workforce 
(Davis, 2007) were under the control of buyout firms. 
 22
The amount of capital involved was quite substantial. Buyout opportunities 
were offered only to institutional investors and wealthy individuals (accredited 
investors) as required by law. GPs typically charged a 2% management fee per annum 
and 20% of annual profits in the form of carried interest (two-and-twenty arrangement), 
which typically led to fabulously rich pay schemes. GP pay became rather controversial 
by the mid 2000s as the average size and visibility of buyouts increased. Some of the 
world’s wealthiest individuals in 2007 were buyout executives such as Blackstone’s 
Steve Schwarzman (with a net worth of $7.8 billion), KKR’s Henry Kravis ($5.5 
billion) and Carlyle’s David Rubinstein ($2.5 billion) according to Forbes magazine 
(Douglas, 2007). Adding controversy to PE buyouts was the fact that these partnerships 
were taxed in the form of carried interest at 15%, similar to long-term capital gains 
taxes and quite unlike ordinary corporate tax rates of 35%. By the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the buyout phenomenon that had previously been essentially US-centered 
became global as buyout firms searched for targets around the world, developing 
particularly strong presences in Europe, where buyouts attracted controversial coverage 
from the popular press as illustrated in Figure 2. Further, Figure 3 shows selected US 
buyout firms by the 2000s, many of which had also played central roles in the 1980s’ 
LBO wave such as KKR and Clayton, Dubilier & Rice. 
Not unlike the previous boom-and-bust cycle of the 1980s, the PE buyout boom 
peaked in the third quarter of 2007, as the value of buyout transactions by PE firms fell 
68% from the previous quarter as a liquidity crisis reached the credit markets that had 
made such deals possible. Table 3 shows this boom-and-bust cycle.  
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Given the relative newness of the phenomenon, scholars have examined recent 
PE buyouts less intensively than the 1980s’ LBO wave. A brief review of scholarly 
work on the recent PE buyout cycle follows. Cumming, Siegel and Wright (2007) 
provide an overview of the literature, distinguishing between financial returns and 
‘real’ (productivity-related) returns to investors. Guo, Hotchkiss and Song (2007) 
examined the question of how PE buyouts create value and found increases in operating 
performance in buyout targets after the completion of the transaction. The authors also 
found that the improvement of cash flows after the buyout event was higher in targets 
where the CEO had been replaced. Cao and Lerner (2007) examined the performance 
of reverse leveraged buyouts (R-LBOs), which are buyout targets that subsequently go 
public again after a limited time under PE ownership. Further, Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005) examined the capital inflows and performance of PE partnerships while Davis 
(2007) studied the impact of PE buyouts on employment in buyout targets. 
Commenting on the potential antecedents of recent buyout activity, Kaplan 
(2007:11) argues that: 
What makes [today’s buyouts] different from the ‘80s is that 
most of the big [buyout] firms, though not all, are now committed to 
operational engineering. That’s why most of them now have a pool of 
former CEOs or operating executives. They bring them in to advice on 
where there is fat that can be taken out [...]. In the late 1980s and 
afterward, [...] incentives and board monitoring at public companies 
have also improved. The buyout firms have responded to such changes 
by developing industry and operating expertise that they can use to add 
value to their investments. Many of the firms have differentiated 
themselves by acquiring the industry knowledge to oversee the strategies 
and operations of their portfolio companies. And they have also created 
networks of operating executives—in many cases, highly regarded 
former CEOs – to ensure that their portfolio firms have the best 
managers and advice. 
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As noted, Kaplan’s (2007) proposition on the potential for operational 
engineering has yet to be empirically tested, controlling for direct measures of agency 
costs which gauge potential for governance engineering in the context of buyouts. Next, 
I define explicitly what a buyout is in the context of this study before detailing a set of 
hypotheses and research design. 
3.3. A Definition of Buyouts: Scope of this Study 
In this paper, buyouts are defined as going-private transactions in which a 
financial acquirer (or a group of investors led by a financial acquirer) in the form of a 
PE (private equity) partnership purchases the controlling equity stake in a publicly-
traded target, usually with debt financing. This transaction results in the formation of a 
new privately-held firm with a typically high debt-to-equity ratio, and whose equity is 
closely held by a small group of large outside investors (including the lead financial 
acquirer) and a group of managers with high-powered incentives. Further, it is 
important to note that the buyout target may be a private firm, a listed firm, or the 
division of a firm (either public or private). In this paper, I focus solely on whole-firm 
buyouts of listed firms, which lie at the heart of the debate around the agency costs of 
free cash flows. 
PE firms are usually structured as limited partnerships with one or more general 
partners (GPs) and one or more limited partners (LPs) in the form of a PE partnership. 
GPs are in the same legal position as partners in a conventional firm: they have 
management control, share firm profits in predefined proportions, and have joint 
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liability for debt. GPs also have authority as agents of the firm to bind all the other 
partners in contracts with third parties. Like shareholders in a corporation, LPs have 
limited liability, are only liable on debts incurred by the firm to the extent of their 
registered investment, and they have no management authority. GPs pay to LPs the 
equivalent of a dividend on their investment, the nature and extent of which is usually 
defined in the partnership agreement. Whereas the PE structure described above was 
already in place during the 1980s’ LBO wave, the buyout cycle that started in the early 
2000s became known as the PE buyout phenomenon as noted above.  
Some buyout firms may engage in other types of activities beyond buyouts, 
including VC (venture capital), PIPE (private investment in public equity), and special 
situations such as distressed debt. In this paper, I exclude all of these cases and focus 
solely on whole-firm buyouts of publicly-traded (listed) firms. Further, several types of 
buyouts are considered here. As noted above, buyouts may be leveraged (LBOs) or not. 
Whereas most buyouts involve leverage, some buyout firms may execute transactions 
with little or no use of leverage. Unlevered buyouts are defined as buyouts with a post-
buyout leverage of 30% or less (following Long and Ravenscraft, 1993a) and are also 
included in this study. Further, MBOs (Management Buyouts) are buyouts in which the 
managers of a company purchase the company’s controlling interest from existing 
shareholders, usually with the help of a buyout firm. In the present study, MBOs are 
included. The inclusion of this special type of buyout also raises potential 
methodological concerns associated with endogeneity, as will be discussed in detail and 
addressed below. 
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Further, a practice that did not occur widely in 1980s’ LBO wave but became 
quite widespread with the 2000s’ PE buyout cycle was the club deal, in which a group 
of PE firms pools its assets together and executes the buyout collectively, in a practice 
that allows PE firms to acquire larger targets and to reduce risks by taking smaller 
individual investments. In this paper, my definition of buyouts includes club deals. 
Finally, recapitalizations involve the restructuring a company’s debt and equity mix, 
often with the aim of making a company’s capital structure more stable. Because this 
does not lead to a change in firm ownership, these types of deals are not included in this 
paper. Now that this study’s definition of buyouts is complete, I next present the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
4.1. Governance Engineering 
Agency theory is built on the premise that the separation of ownership and 
control in the modern corporation potentially leads to self-interested actions by 
entrenched agents and therefore firm underperformance. The potential for this conflict 
of interest between agents and principals leads to the need for monitoring mechanisms 
designed to protect shareholders and avoid shareholder expropriation by self-interested 
agents (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this study, I seek 
to draw from the most widely applied measures of agency problems in strategic 
management (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998). Extant literature reflects two common remedies 
that mitigate agency costs: board monitoring and incentive alignment. 
4.1.1. Board Monitoring  
In theory, the firm’s board of directors is the primary monitoring device aimed 
at protecting shareholder interests and alleviating potential agency problems. Agency 
theorists posit that the primary responsibility of the board is to ensure that management 
actions are consistent with shareholder interests (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). 
With regards to board composition, the consensus in the corporate governance 
literature (e.g., Mizruchi, 1983; Dalton et al., 1998; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001; 
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Cannella, Finkelstein and Hambrick, 2008) is that boards of directors comprised of 
predominantly outside directors rather than insiders represent a more effective 
monitoring of managers. This preference for outsider-dominated boards of directors is 
grounded on agency theory. Outside directors are believed to provide stronger control 
as a result of their independence from management as inside directors may not be able 
or willing to monitor the CEO with equanimity (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). As noted 
by Dalton et al. (1998), however, outside directors who maintain personal or 
professional relationships with the firm or firm management (affiliated directors) are 
not independent and not believed to be effective in fulfilling the board’s control role. 
Affiliated directors are those with significant business dealings with the firm, defined 
by the SEC as involving $60,000 per year or more and can be identified through proxy 
statements or information services such as the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
– IRRC (Cannella, Finkelstein and Hambrick, 2008). 
In contrast, independent directors are expected to be more effective monitors of 
management behavior because of their focus on financial performance as a central 
component of monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983); the increased likelihood of CEO 
dismissal in case of poor performance (e.g., Couglan and Schmidt, 1985); the incentive 
to protect their personal reputations as directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983); and the 
likelihood to exercise greater objectivity because they are not as beholden to CEOs as 
are inside directors (e.g., Walsh and Seward, 1990). In the context of buyouts, if the 
agency-theoretic logic proposed by Jensen (1986, 1989) is valid, then the firms with the 
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least independent board of directors are the ones expected to underperform and thus 
become the target of a buyout. Therefore: 
 
H1: The less board independence in a given firm, the higher the probability that the 
firm will become the target of a buyout.     
 
As with board composition, agency theorists posit that the CEO should not 
serve simultaneously as chairperson of the board in an arrangement called CEO duality. 
According to agency theory predictions, CEO duality promotes CEO entrenchment by 
reducing board monitoring effectiveness (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). Powerful 
individuals with dual CEO and board chair positions may reduce board monitoring 
effectiveness via a host of activities. First, CEOs with dual positions may influence 
director selection that further strengthens a CEO’s power base (Pfeffer, 1981), which is 
also seen as a sign of entrenchment (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Second, a powerful CEO 
that takes the chair position on the board gains control of both the agenda and the 
debate in board meetings (Cannella and Holcomb, 2005; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 
1994). Third, duality may lead to further entrenchment because board chairs provide 
outsiders with most of the information about the organization (Mallette and Fowler, 
1992).  
In the context of buyouts, if the agency-based arguments by Jensen (1986, 
1989) hold, then the firms with CEO duality are more likely to underperform due to the 
decreased capacity for board monitoring, thus becoming the target of a buyout. 
Therefore: 
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H2: CEO duality in a given firm increases the probability that the firm will become the 
target of a buyout.     
 
4.1.2. Incentive Alignment 
Agency theorists argue that one way to mitigate agency costs is to increase 
managerial equity holdings or to grant stock options, thus aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theorists therefore 
suggest that when managers own substantial equity stakes in the firms they run, they 
are more likely to act in shareholders’ interests given their shared financial interests 
(e.g., Perry and Zenner, 2000). The reason for this alignment of interests is that 
managerial stock ownership causes managers’ wealth to vary directly with firm 
performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In the absence of insider equity ownership, 
managers are more likely to act in a self-serving way by pursuing projects that further 
their own interests at shareholders’ expense. 
The same logic has been extended to board members. Several empirical studies 
rely on directors’ and officers’ (D&O) equity to capture insider equity ownership 
(Jensen, 1993). Some directors or board members also serve as officers (managers) in 
their firms and are thus inside directors. Regardless of whether a given director is an 
officer or not, all board members are subject to the same alignment incentives as 
officers. If officers with high equity stakes have the incentive to act in the best interests 
of shareholders, directors who are not officers but who have high equity stakes in the 
firm also have the incentive to effectively monitor management behavior. In line with 
this reasoning, Jensen argued that “the idea that outside directors with little or no equity 
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stake in the company could effectively monitor and discipline the managers who 
selected them has proven hollow at best” (1989: 64). Therefore: 
 
H3: The lower the equity ownership stake held by insiders in a given firm, the higher 
the probability that the firm will become the target of a buyout.     
 
4.2. Potential for Operational Engineering (POE) 
Potential for operational engineering refers to the degree to which a firm’s 
operational inefficiency is higher than the competition’s, and therefore could be 
improved. According to Kaplan (2007), the main difference between 1980s’ LBOs and 
the more recent wave of buyouts is the focus on operational engineering. Kaplan 
(2007:11) argues that in recent-era buyouts, “financial and governance engineering 
continue to be important. However, most buyout firms try to augment financial and 
governance engineering with another discipline – what I call operational engineering.” 
An implication of this statement is that, whereas governance engineering in the form of 
agency-variables was a key driver of buyout activity in the 1980s, an additional 
antecedent in the form of potential for operational engineering must be considered in 
the examination of 1990s and 2000s buyouts. If Kaplan’s (2007) proposition on the 
potential for operational engineering is valid, then buyout firms will be especially 
interested in buyout targets in which acquirers believe to able to affect operational 
engineering.  
The personnel recruiting practices of buyout firms, which had traditionally 
focused on dealmakers with prior experience in investment banking, have more 
recently been extended to include former senior executives with operational experience 
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(Meerkatt et al., 2008; Kaplan, 2007). According to Meerkatt et al. (2008), former 
senior executives with operational experience are apt to have access to social networks 
enabling ex ante buyout opportunities, and also have hands-on experience in working 
with incumbent managers in setting and implementing ex post agendas for operational 
improvements. The recruitment of operating executives thus enables the pursuit of 
operational engineering in buyout targets via advice in the form of mentoring and 
guidance (Hendry, 2002), in addition to the traditional role of monitoring. Buyout firms 
that employ former operating executives will thus be better positioned to help 
managements in buyout targets achieve goals by developing their technical competence 
via the transfer of skills, or to improve their understanding of goals beyond the ones 
stipulated contractually. 
The pursuit of operational engineering in buyout targets is essentially an 
efficiency debate (e.g., Fox and Marcus, 1992). More generally, examples of efficiency 
measures in strategic management have included turnover ratios for total assets, 
receivables, and fixed assets (see Carton and Hofer, 2006, for a review). Specifically in 
the context of buyouts, typical ways to measure buyout target inefficiency include a 
low working capital turnover (e.g., Fox and Marcus, 1992; Kaplan, 1988), which is a 
measure of asset inefficiency. Relatedly, the empirical evidence shows that, at least in 
the short-term, cash management improves in buyout targets after the buyout is 
complete (e.g., Kaplan, 1989; Long and Ravenscraft, 1993a). One likely reason is 
offered by Singh (1990), who argued that potential buyout targets with asset 
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inefficiencies in the form of higher levels of receivables and lower inventory turnovers 
are apt to have a lower quality of operational controls and implementation. 
Potential buyout targets that underperform operationally in the form of high 
asset inefficiency therefore will become especially appealing to buyout firms, since the 
context of operational inefficiencies exacerbate the effects of governance engineering 
(board independence, CEO duality and insider equity ownership) on the probability of 
buyout. Therefore: 
 
H4: The higher a firm’s asset inefficiency, the stronger the negative relationship 
between board independence and the probability that the firm will become the 
target of a buyout. 
 
H5: The higher a firm’s asset inefficiency, the stronger the positive relationship 
between CEO duality and the probability that the firm will become the target of a 
buyout. 
 
H6: The higher a firm’s asset inefficiency, the stronger the negative relationship 
between insider equity ownership and the probability that the firm will become the 
target of a buyout. 
 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the hypothesized relationships laid out above in the form 
of an empirical model, the implementation of which I describe below. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODS 
Qualitatively, the hypotheses laid out above were informed by unstructured 
interviews with buyout market participants – both on the buy side and on the sell side.1 
In the subsections below, I describe the quantitative features of this study, including the 
sampling, statistical technique, variables and measures employed. 
5.1. Sample 
This study links three datasets. The first dataset is Thomson Financial’s SDC 
(Securities Data Company), which offers detailed data on IPO and M&A activity 
amongst other types of information. Given the comprehensiveness of its coverage, SDC 
has been widely used in prior research in strategic management. Using SDC data, I start 
with a search for buyouts as transactions coded as “complete deal”, “deal is a LBO” 
and “acquirer is a LBO firm” from 1998 through 2007 inclusive. I exclude buyouts of 
financial targets in order to keep consistency with prior work (e.g., Opler and Titman 
(1993). This search yields 1121 buyouts, which include divestitures or divisional 
buyouts (413 deals), whole-company private-to-private buyouts (622 deals), and whole 
company public-to-private buyouts (86 deals). Given this study’s aim to build on 
agency-theoretic predictions, I focus on the whole company public-to-private deals 
only. Whereas divisional buyouts could also be of interest from an agency-theoretic 
                                                 
1
 The interviewees were: Alex Nieberding (CVC Partners), Dennis Schaecher (BOS LLC) and Clay 
Hamner (Montrose Capital Corporation) on the buy side, as well as Mike Bowers (CoMark) and an 
anonymous contributor on the sell side. 
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perspective, data availability is a challenge since US corporations are not required to 
report separate sets of financials for each one of their subsidiaries or lines of businesses. 
Next, I then evaluate and confirm that each one of these 86 whole-company buyouts is 
consistent with the definition provided in this study via press releases and The Wall 
Street Journal. 
The second dataset I use in this study is the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC), which offers data on board structure and executive equity holdings for 
US publicly-held corporations. Governance data from IRRC is available for 65 of the 
86 firms identified as undergoing a whole-company buyout via the SDC search 
described above. The count of 65 buyout events featured in this study is comparable 
with other studies in this literature stream, as shown on Table 2. The 65 whole-
company US buyouts span 27 different industry segments at 2-digit SIC level, as shown 
on Table 4. Further, the rapid acceleration of overall buyout activity in the US from 
2005 through 2007 is reflected in my dataset as shown on Table 5, which offers a 
sample description by year. 
The third dataset I use in this study is S&P’s Compustat, which offers firm-level 
financial data for US listed firms. Compustat II (Business Segments) offers limited data 
points from firms’ income statements for each of the firm’s line of business, which is 
necessary for developing a control measure of diversification as explained below. 
Unfortunately, the balance sheet data that could be used to examine divisional buyouts 
is not provided. 
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In order to construct a risk set of all US firms that could become a buyout target 
from 1998 to 2007 inclusive, I merge the governance data available from IRRC with 
firm financials from S&P’s Compustat in the form of a panel dataset. This data merger 
resulted in a master file with 1459 publicly-traded firms with complete data, totaling 
8631 observations. Of the 1459 firms, 65 became the target of a buyout, an additional 
260 became the target of (non-buyout) M&A, 18 were delisted, and 1116 were still 
operating independently at the end of the sample period. Given the need to control for 
competing risks as explained below, I coded non-buyout M&A transactions and 
delistings accordingly.  
5.2. Statistical Technique 
In general, event history analysis is used to analyze the effects of predictor 
variables on the occurrence or non-occurrence and the timing of specific events 
(Allison, 1984). In this study, I use the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972). 
The Cox proportional hazards model is semi-parametric and therefore more flexible as 
well as robust in cases in which it is difficult to specify a particular shape of the time 
dependence of the hazard rate (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995).This modeling approach is 
associated with several advantages as it accounts for both discrete events and 
continuous timescale data, accommodates left truncation and right censoring 
simultaneously, allows time-dependent independent variables, accommodates 
competing risks, and identifies both cross-sectional and longitudinal effects (Allison, 
1995). These properties are particularly useful to our data for investigating the 
antecedents of buyout activity over time. The model can be specified as: 
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(1) H(t) = h(t) exp [β X(t)] 
 
where the hazard rate H(t) is the product of an unspecified baseline rate, h(t), a second 
term X(t), specifying the values at time t of a vector of independent variables, and β, 
representing a vector of parameters embodying the effect of each independent variable. 
The model is proportional in that the hazard is obtained by shifting the baseline hazard 
as the independent variables change over time. The model assumes that, whatever the 
shape of the baseline hazard, it is the same for all firms. Therefore, the baseline hazard 
cancels out, and there are no intercepts. 
5.3. Variables and Measurement 
In the subsections below, I describe all variables and measurement definitions, 
including the dependent variable, independent variables and controls.   
5.3.1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable Buyout denotes the probability of a buyout occurring at 
time t, given that the event has not occurred prior to that instant. The dependent 
variable is dummy-coded to indicate whether a buyout has occurred towards the end of 
each spell. Firms that were still operating as independent entities without becoming the 
target of a buyout at the end of the sample period (1998-2007) will be treated as right-
censored. As noted above, competing risks or outcomes associated with non-buyout 
M&A transactions as well as delistings from stock exchanges due to bankruptcy or 
outright liquidation were also coded accordingly. Hazard models accommodate such 
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competing outcomes by treating them as distinct risks (Cox and Oakes, 1984), which is 
a statistical approach adequate for buyouts research. 
5.3.2. Independent variables 
Consistent with the event history design, all data were collected annually. All 
independent variables reported here are time-varying, and all financial data were 
collected from S&P’s Compustat. 
The first independent variable is Board Independence, defined as the percentage 
of board members that are independent and therefore not affiliated directors according 
to the IRRC. Data were sourced from IRRC, which defines an independent director as 
someone who is not a former or current employee; a service provider, supplier, or 
customer (or employee or director thereof); a recipient of charitable funds; or a family 
member of a director or executive of the firm. 
Second, CEO Duality is a dummy variable coded as one if the firm’s CEO also 
serves as chairperson at the same firm. Data were provided from IRRC.  
Third, Insider Equity Ownership is defined as the percentage of equity 
controlled by the firms’ directors and officers as provided by the IRRC.  
Fourth, Asset Inefficiency combines several inefficiency items as introduced by 
Carton and Hofer (2006) and applied by others (e.g., van Mourik, 2007). These include: 
liquidity inefficiency, defined as cash and equivalents (Compustat #1) scaled by net 
sales (#12); working capital inefficiency, defined as working capital (#179) scaled by 
net sales (#12); fixed-asset inefficiency, defined as gross property, plant and equipment 
(#7) scaled by net sales (#12); and total asset inefficiency, defined as total assets (#6) 
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scaled by net sales (#12). These measures were highly correlated, so I used weights 
from factor analysis to extract a unified construct. This analysis yielded a one-factor 
weighted average of asset inefficiency with an eigenvalue of 3.38 that explained 84.5% 
of the total variance in the four items described above. See Figure 5 for a model of this 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
5.3.3. Control Variables 
I start by controlling for antecedents of buyout activity that have been 
previously tested. The first control variable is Free Cash Flow, defined as the firm’s 
free cash flow divided by net sales. I follow Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and define free 
cash flow as operating income before depreciation (Compustat #13), minus total 
income taxes (#16), minus the change in deferred taxes from the previous year to the 
current year (change in #35), minus gross interest expenses on total debt (#15), minus 
the total amount of preferred dividend requirement on cumulative preferred stock and 
dividends paid on non-cumulative preferred stock (#19), minus the total dollar amount 
of dividends declared on common stock (#21).  
The second control variable is Unrelated Diversification. I follow Wiersema 
and Liebeskind (1995) in their LBO study and use the Jacquemin-Berry entropy 
measure of diversification at the 2-digit SIC level. This measure is estimated as: 
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where Pi is the share of total firm sales of the ith line of business. Following Palepu 
(1985) and Wiersema and Liebeskind (1995), unrelated diversification is measured 
using the 2-digit SIC lines of business of the firm to estimate Pi.  
Third, I follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and estimate Tobin’s Q as market 
value divided by book value of assets, where market value is the firm’s market value of 
common stock (#24 * #25), plus the book value of assets (#6), less the book value of 
common equity (#60), less deferred taxes on the balance sheet (#74).  
Fourth, I also control for Leverage defined as the firm’s total debt (#9 + #34) 
divided by total equity (#216) in order to control for the alternative explanation 
according to which firms that are already highly levered may become a less attractive 
target for buyout firms.  
Fifth, I control for Taxes defined as the firm’s income tax expenses (#16) scaled 
by net sales, controlling for the potential explanation offered by Lowenstein (1985). 
Finally, I control for Year Fixed Effects to account for unobservable 
macroeconomic effects. I also control for Industry Fixed Effects to ensure 
comparability across potential buyout targets in the same industrial sector at the 2-digit 
SIC level. For both year and industry fixed effects, I have included k-1 dummy 
variables in all models. See Table 6 for a summary of variables and measures.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of the variables. 
Some notable correlations follow.  
First, free cash flow is not significantly correlated with board independence or 
CEO duality, and it is only weakly correlated with insider equity ownership (p < .10). 
This finding highlights the importance of using direct measures of agency variables 
(when available) rather than relying on proxies. In light of prior scholarly work on 
1980s LBOs employing free cash flows as a proxy of agency cost, one way to interpret 
this finding is that free cash flow as a proxy measure was adequate in the 1980s but 
probably less so later on given the evolution of corporate governance mechanisms in 
the US as described by Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003).  
At the same time, it is noteworthy that the correlation between free cash flow 
and asset inefficiency is very high at -.79 (p < .001). This strong, negative correlation 
may suggest that prior work on buyouts (e.g., Singh, 1990; Opler and Titman, 1993) 
testing free cash flow theory with proxy measures of agency costs may have rather 
offered tests of the POE argument instead.  
Next, the probability of buyout and Tobin’s Q are negatively correlated (p < 
.05), in line with one of the data panels analyzed by Opler and Titman (1993). Further, 
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board independence and CEO duality are negatively correlated (p < .001), consistent 
with the notion that the separation of the CEO and board chair positions is associated 
with board independence.  
Given some high correlations among the variables, I investigated potential 
multicollinearity problems, yet found that the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) 
value for all models was 4.64, well below the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 (Neter, 
Wasserman and Kutner, 1985). 
Figure 6 presents a trend analysis examining key agency-theoretic variables 
(board independence, CEO duality and insider equity ownership). This analysis shows 
that board independence increased from 1998 to 2007 and CEO duality decreased in the 
same period, consistent with Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001). However, insider equity 
ownership remained largely unchanged in this period. 
6.2. Event History Analysis 
Table 8 reports the main results of the event history analysis examining how 
governance engineering interacts with asset inefficiency to shape the probability of 
buyout. All models on Table 8 are highly significant (p < 0.001). Model I is the 
baseline specification comprising control variables only. Model II augments Model I by 
adding governance engineering variables (board independence, CEO duality and insider 
equity ownership) in addition to asset inefficiency. Models III through V introduce the 
direct effects of asset inefficiency, as well as its interaction with each one of the three 
governance engineering variables.  
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Hypotheses 1 through 3 test predictions from agency theory according to which 
board independence, CEO duality and insider equity ownership are associated with the 
probability of buyout. In Table 8, none of the coefficient estimates for these three 
variables on Model II are significant, providing no support for H1, H2 or H3.  
Hypotheses 4 through 6 state that asset inefficiency moderates the effect of 
governance engineering variables on the probability of buyout. Specifically, hypothesis 
4 predicts that the higher a firm’s asset inefficiency, the stronger the negative 
relationship between board independence and the probability of the firm becoming a 
buyout target. In Table 8 (Model III), the interaction term is significant and negative (p 
<.05). Because Cox models are non-linear and semi-parametric, a plot is helpful in 
interpreting this result. Figure 7 shows the baseline survival function for different 
firms.2 The plot shows how the interaction effect of asset inefficiency and board 
independence decreases the probability of buyout, providing no support for H4. 
Further, hypothesis 5 predicts that the higher a firm’s asset inefficiency, the 
stronger the positive relationship between CEO duality and the probability that the firm 
will become the target of a buyout. In Table 8 (Model IV), the interaction term is not 
significant, providing no support for H5. Finally, hypothesis 6 predicts that the higher a 
firm’s asset inefficiency, the stronger the negative relationship between insider equity 
                                                 
2
 The mean firm is a hypothetical firm in which the values for all variables of interest are set equal to the 
sample’s mean. Firm A is a hypothetical firm with high board independence (75th- percentile) and high 
asset inefficiency (75th- percentile). Firm B is a hypothetical firm with high board independence (75th- 
percentile) and low asset inefficiency (25th- percentile). Firm C is a hypothetical firm with low board 
independence (25th- percentile) and high asset inefficiency (75th- percentile). Firm D is a hypothetical 
firm with low board independence (25th- percentile) and low asset inefficiency (25th- percentile). 
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ownership and the probability that the firm will become the target of a buyout. In Table 
8 (Model V), the interaction term is not significant, providing no support for H6. 
There are also some noteworthy patterns of results for control variables. First, 
Tobin’s Q is strongly significant in all model specifications (p <.001), lending support 
to the undervaluation argument of buyout activity tested by Opler and Titman (1993). 
My results show that, all else equal, firm undervaluation in the form of a low Tobin’s Q 
in relation to industry peers is a key predictor of buyout activity. In other words, the 
firms that seem cheaper than competitors are the ones that tend to be bought out. Not 
surprisingly, buyout firms thus seem to focus on the more inexpensive targets. Second, 
taxes are marginally significant only in Models III (p < .10), lending no support to the 
argument that firms with comparatively high tax expenses are more apt to become 
buyout targets, as proposed by Lowenstein (1985). Finally, year fixed effects and 
industry year effects are jointly significant in all models. 
6.3. Robustness Analyses 
I also performed several changes in specification in order to assess the 
robustness of the models and results discussed above.  
6.3.1. Potential Sample Selection 
Further, there might be a concern that potential sample selection bias might 
affect the interpretation of my results. Specifically, I define the risk set of my analysis 
as the entire universe of publicly-listed firms with available data as reported by S&P’s 
Compustat from 1998 to 2007 inclusive. Yet, IRRC offers governance variables for 
only a subset of the firms that report financials to S&P’s Compustat, comprising 17% 
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of publicly-traded firms. Firms covered by IRRC tend to be larger, more established 
organizations. But this potential focus on larger firms would work against the 
hypotheses laid out above, making the statistical tests more conservative. Therefore, 
potential sample selection may be a lesser concern in this study.  
Despite this consideration, one adequate approach to empirically account for 
potential sample selection bias is provided by Lee (1983) in the generalization of the 
Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model. This approach provides a correction for 
potential selection in the form of the correction variable lambda (λ), which makes the 
estimates of predictor variables more precise by mitigating the effects of omitted 
variable bias (Greene, 2000). I follow this approach, which has been applied in strategic 
management (e.g., Leiblein, Reuer and Dalsace, 2002; Turner, Mitchell and Bettis, 
2008), and employ a Cox regression model that predicts the hazard of inclusion in the 
IRRC dataset for all 8422 firms featured in Compustat in a first-stage model that 
generates lambda. The correction variable lambda (λ) is defined as: 
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where Fi (t) is the cumulative hazard function for firm i at time t, Ф is the standard 
normal density function, and Ф-1 is the inverse of the standard normal distribution 
function (Lee, 1983). However, as Table 9 shows, the implementation of a two-stage 
model with correction for potential selection bias did not change the results of the main 
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regressions reported on Table 8. It is also noteworthy that the selection correction 
variable (λ) is not significant in any of the second-stage analyses as shown on Table 9. 
6.3.2. Potential Endogeneity 
Finally, I took steps to address potential concerns on how endogeneity may 
affect the interpretation of the results presented above. For example, it may be argued 
that self-interested managers may purposefully drive lower employee and asset 
productivity, which would manifest itself in the form of higher potential for operational 
engineering, underperformance, and thus in a higher probability of buyout. In this 
hypothetical case, self-interested management would be aiming for a buyout that would 
enable them to stay on as managers of the buyout target after the completion of the 
transaction, but with higher-powered incentives. In order to evaluate this possibility, I 
sought to determine how many of the 65 buyouts in my sample are MBOs 
(management buyouts), since the self-interested manager seeking a profitable buyout 
would only reap personal rewards in the case of an MBO. This approach has been 
applied by Long and Ravenscraft (1993a), and represents a particularly controversial 
aspect of buyouts since managers are insiders that have access to privileged 
information. However, I found that only 7 of the 65 buyouts in my sample are MBOs, 
and therefore conclude that endogeneity may be a lesser concern in the interpretation of 
the results of this study. 
6.3.3. Alternative Measures  
First, the POE measure employed in this study is based on asset inefficiency 
following Carton and Hofer (2006). Yet, measures based on personnel inefficiency or 
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productivity may also be considered as potential antecedents of buyout activity (e.g., 
Fox and Marcus, 1992). I have therefore developed two measures to reflect this 
concept.  
The first one is Employee Inefficiency, defined as number of employees per unit 
of net sales, gauging the level of overall employee productivity in line and support 
functions of firms. Baker and Wruck (1989) and Palepu (1990) argued that a post-
buyout reorganization may lead to stronger operational performance following 
personnel reductions in the buyout target due to the removal of hierarchical layers, the 
elimination of communication bottlenecks, a faster flow of information, and a quicker 
pace of decision-making.  
Second, a related albeit different personnel-centered measure is Overheads 
Inefficiency in the form of SG&A (sales, general and administrative expenses scaled by 
net sales), which gauges personnel productivity in support functions only. As shown on 
Tables 10 and 11, however, no empirical support was found for either employee or 
overheads inefficiency as a predictor of buyout activity.  
Third, variables associated with the general market conditions affecting overall 
buyout activity may also influence the regression results presented above. Whereas the 
year fixed effects employed in my regressions may capture some of these general 
market conditions, buyout firm-level variables such as the availability of equity and 
debt capital or recent experience with buyouts in specific industry factors may also 
influence the results presented above. Therefore, I have included two additional 
variables. Dry Powder gauges the overall availability of equity capital in the buyout 
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industry available from Thomson Financial. Credit Spread, defined as the interest rate 
spread between US government bonds and junk (speculative) bonds, measures the ease 
of access to debt financing for buyouts. These data are available from the Federal 
Reserve Board. However, as Table 12 shows, these additional variables did not improve 
model fit above and beyond the year fixed effects, which had to be excluded due to 
multicollinearity.  
Next, Table 13 offers a robustness check without the industry fixed effects 
reported on Table 8. The results are qualitatively unchanged. 
Further, I examine more closely on Tables 14 through 18 each one of the four 
measures employed to build the one-factor construct (asset inefficiency) which gauges 
POE as utilized on the main regressions on Table 8. As the Pearson correlation 
coefficients on Table 14 show, each one of the four measures (cash inefficiency, 
working capital inefficiency, fixed-asset inefficiency and total-asset inefficiency) are 
highly correlated with the one-factor construct asset inefficiency (p<.001). I therefore 
substitute the one-factor construct for each one of the four measures on Tables 15, 16, 
17 and 18. The results show that two of these measures (liquidity inefficiency and 
working capital inefficiency) lower the probability of a buyout event as the coefficients 
of their direct effects are negative and significant (p<.05), whereas another measure 
(fixed-asset inefficiency) increases the probability of a buyout event as its regression 
coefficient is positive and significant (p<.05). These results highlight an opportunity for 
future research, which I elaborate below.  
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On Tables 19 and 20, I check for the robustness of the results presented on 
Table 8 by building on the measure of free cash flows as applied by Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989). Whereas this measure has been applied in buyout studies and in broader 
corporate governance studies, it does not include what may be considered a key input in 
the computation of free cash flows: capital expenditures. I therefore create an adjusted 
measure of free cash flows by subtracting capital expenditures (scaled by net sales) 
from the measure employed by Lehn and Poulsen (1989). Pearson correlations with 
variables of interest are shown on Table 19. On Table 20, I provide Cox regression 
analyses with this adjusted measure of free cash flows. The results are qualitatively 
similar to the ones reported on Table 8. 
Finally, I also provide robustness checks for the model specification employed 
in this study. Specifically, prior work in the buyouts literature stream has relied on 
Logit regressions to examine the antecedents of buyout activity. As mentioned above, 
these models cannot accommodate competing risks. Yet, the question remains as of 
whether the results presented above are sensitive to model specification. On Table 21, I 
re-estimate the regressions of Table 8 with Logit models, and find that the results are 
qualitatively unchanged. Further, the extreme rareness of buyouts in this sample (65 
buyouts in a sample of 1459 firms and 8631 years) may bias the results of Logit 
regressions. King and Zeng (1999) warn against the use of Logit models in rare-event 
samples and propose the application of RE (Rare Events) Logit models instead. On 
Table 22, I re-estimate the regressions of Table 8 with RE-Logit models, and find that 
the results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, I examined the interplay between governance engineering and 
operational engineering in the context of buyouts. In doing so, I aimed to address two 
questions associated with the antecedents of buyout activity. First, prior work (e.g., 
Singh, 1990; Opler and Titman, 1993) relied on proxies rather than direct measures of 
agency costs which gauge a firm’s potential for governance engineering. In this study, I 
offered a more direct test of the agency-based argument by using measures such as 
board independence, CEO duality and insider equity ownership to predict buyout 
activity. The second question I aimed to address with this study centered on Kaplan’s 
(2007) proposition on operational engineering. I thus examined potential antecedents of 
PE buyouts, testing Kaplan’s (2007) proposition while controlling for agency-related 
antecedents. In empirical tests where I controlled for competing risks with a Cox 
proportional hazards model, I did not find strong support for either proposition as an 
antecedent of buyout activity. 
This research is associated with potential contributions and implications to 
corporate governance theory and practice. It is also associated with several limitations, 
which future research may address. I start by elaborating on contributions and 
implications as follows. 
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7.1. Contributions 
This research offers at least four contributions to corporate governance research 
in general and buyouts in specific. 
7.1.1. Theory 
In this study, I tested a new theory proposed by Kaplan (2007), according to 
whom POE (potential for operational engineering) is a predictor of buyout activity in 
addition to agency conditions first proposed by Jensen (1986). Taken as a whole, the 
evidence I found failed to lend strong support for either proposition as an antecedent of 
buyout activity in my sample of buyouts events from 1998 through 2007.  
Yet, I found statistical significance in one specific instance. In a context of high 
asset inefficiency (high POE) and high board independence, the probability of buyout is 
decreased. This finding is perhaps not counterintuitive. One potential explanation for 
this finding is that buyout executives will avoid buying out targets that underperform 
operationally and have independent boards at the same time because buyout executives 
are more confident about their ability to address governance problems (board 
monitoring) than to solve operational problems, which – in addition to requiring expert 
knowledge and experience – also require significantly more attention and effort by 
buyout executives to address. Another potential explanation is that buyout executives 
behave in a risk-averse fashion when considering buyout targets that seem problematic 
operationally. 
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the lack of strong support for extant theory 
(FCF-based and POE-based) as derived from my findings is more consistent with the 
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perspective offered by a manager who was interviewed as part of this study. This 
interviewee is a successful founder-CEO who decided to sell his manufacturing 
company to a prestigious buyout firm in the early to mid 2000s. When asked whether 
the new owners were able to add value in the form of advice in addition to the typical 
control (monitoring) role, the interviewee reacted quite strongly: 
You need to understand something. These buyouts guys are 
some of the smartest people you will ever find, but I would never 
invite them to come see me on-site and give me advice on how to run 
my business. They sure know a lot about finance, but they don’t have 
a clue about the simplest of principles on how to run an industrial 
operation and handle messy issues with employees or clients. They 
would destabilize my operation if they were allowed to get their 
hands dirty. This is why I made sure that all our meetings were in 
hotels or restaurants – before, during and after the buyout. 
 
 
7.1.2. Measures 
In this study, I employed more direct measures of agency problems in the form 
of board independence, CEO duality and insider equity ownership, rather than the 
agency proxy employed in previous work in the form of free cash flows scaled by net 
sales. Whereas high free cash flows may serve as a measure of agency problems, it is 
also likely that this measure is associated with other conditions which have little to do 
with agency problems.  
This reasoning is consistent with descriptive statistics in my study, in which free 
cash flow was not significantly correlated with board independence or CEO duality, 
and was only weakly correlated with insider equity ownership (p < .10). At the same 
time, the correlation between free cash flow and asset inefficiency was highly 
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significant (-.79, p < .001), suggesting that prior work on buyouts based on proxy 
measures of agency costs may have rather offered tests of the POE argument instead. In 
light of prior work on 1980s’ LBOs, one way to interpret my findings is that free cash 
flow as an agency proxy was an adequate measure in the 1980s, but probably in lesser 
degree from the 1990s onwards given the evolution of US corporate governance as 
described by Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003). An alternative interpretation of my finding 
is that free cash flow was never an adequate measure of agency problems to begin with. 
My study does not offer direct evidence that could answer this question, which would 
require data from the 1980s onwards. 
7.1.3. Methods 
This study departs methodologically from prior work on the antecedents of 
buyout activity. Prior work has relied on logit models to estimate the probability of 
buyout. Whereas adequate given the nature of the binary dependent variable employed, 
logit models do not accommodate situations in which competing risks must be taken 
into account. In this study, I thus control for competing risks of M&A when examining 
buyout activity with a Cox proportional hazards model. Whereas the FCF- and POE-
based arguments may lead to buyout activity, they may also lead to M&A by other 
financial acquirers (e.g. banks) or even strategic acquirers. If this is valid, then the 
proportional hazards approach represents a contribution to the buyout research stream. 
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7.1.4. Phenomenon 
Finally, I extend prior work on LBOs in strategic management (Singh, 1990; 
Wiersema and Liebeskind, 1995) to examine the more recent PE buyout wave. 
Anecdotal evidence has suggested that the more recent PE buyout wave is rather 
different from 1980s’ LBOs. In the 1980s, the typical buyout transaction was usually 
hostile, with heavy use of leverage, pursued by one buyout firm, and with the goal to 
implement governance engineering. By the 2000s, the typical buyout transaction was 
arguably friendly, with limited use of leverage, pursued jointly by more than one 
buyout firm, and with the goal to implement operational engineering. The question as 
of how different 1980s’ LBOs are from 2000s’ PE buyouts remains ultimately open. 
This study offers an initial contribution to this question. 
7.2. Implications 
The empirical results of the present study also lead to implications for theory 
and practice, as explained below. 
7.2.1. Implications for Theory 
From a theoretical perspective, this study leads to several implications. An 
immediate implication that follows from the present study is related to the antecedents 
of PE buyouts. If the present study leads to the conclusion that FCF theory does not 
predict which firms become buyout targets, then strategic management researchers may 
look for alternative explanations for the present-day PE phenomenon. As noted above, 
it is possible that FCF was germane in explaining buyouts in the 1980s, but became less 
important from the 1990s onwards given the profound changes in US corporate 
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governance culminating with the passage of Sarbanes Oxley in 2002. As explained by 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003), internal and external governance mechanisms in US 
corporations became progressively stronger from the 1990s onwards, prompting Kaplan 
(1997) to produce a working paper entitled “we are all Henry Kravis now”.   
The second implication is linked with the consequences of private equity 
ownership in situations where the new owners are more interested in short-term 
financial gains than long-term firm competitiveness. Whilst most research on buyouts 
evaluates consequences from the perspective of key stakeholders of the firm such as 
equity investors, management, employees, bondholders and tax authorities, the 
discussion has yet to focus on the consequences to the firm as an on-going concern. 
This question is of central importance to strategic management scholars. The present 
study raises the question that buyouts may be associated with financial improvements 
only rather than operational improvements. If private equity buyouts lead to financial 
improvements only, then the economic logic of these transactions must be questioned 
since they have no effect on firm competitiveness. 
A third implication concerns the relationship of risk and return, a topic of 
interest in strategic management (e.g. Bowman, 1980; March and Shapira, 1987; 
Andersen, Denrell and Bettis, 2005). A source of controversy in PE buyouts is the 
significant use of leverage and the resulting increase in risk in the buyout target. PE 
buyouts offer an interesting context into which the debate on the relationship between 
risk and return may be extended. Relatedly, a study commissioned by the Yale 
Investments Office showed how buyouts, in the absence of operational improvements, 
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simply increase risk in the buyout target without offering much in return. This study of 
542 buyouts from 1987 to 1998 documented a gross return to investors of 48% per 
year, equivalent to a 36% return net of PE management fees and general partner 
compensation. This return would have widely surpassed the return of comparably-sized 
investments in the S&P 500 stock index, which delivered 17% per year in the same 
period. However, this comparison does not adjust for the high levels of leverage 
typically associated with PE buyouts. Comparably-timed, comparably-sized and 
comparably-leveraged investments in the S&P 500 would have produced an impressive 
86% annual return in the same period, widely surpassing PE returns. Potential 
accusations of biased sampling in this study are counterweighted by the fact that the 
data were gathered from PE firms soliciting business from Yale. David Swensen, the 
longtime chief investment officer of the Yale Endowment, concludes that (2005:135):  
Pure financial engineering represents a commodity, easily 
available to marketable securities investors through margin 
accounts and futures markets. Buyout managers deserve scant 
incremental compensation for adding debt to corporate balance 
sheets. 
 
However, this debate is far from over as Groh and Gottschalg (2006) found 
opposite results in a study of 199 US buyouts from 1984 to 2004. I echo Cumming, 
Siegel and Wright (2007) to state that more research is warranted on the intriguing 
relationship between risk and return in the context of PE buyouts.  
A fourth implication relates to an implicit assumption underlying the FCF 
argument: the notion that managers are self-interested and will rationally take courses 
of action that serve their interests, sometimes at the expense of shareholder interests. 
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Yet, managerial behavior has also been examined from other perspectives. For 
example, bounded rationality (e.g. Simon, 1997) offers an alternative explanation for 
dysfunctional managerial behavior such as overinvestments in listed corporations. 
Specifically, managers may overinvest in value-destroying opportunities not because of 
the combination of self-interest and opportunism as proposed by Jensen (1986) in his 
classic FCF argument, but due to human decision-making processes based on heuristics 
and biases such as overconfidence (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982).   
The analysis of overconfidence relates several branches of the psychology 
literature (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), including the tendency of individuals to 
consider themselves above average on positive characteristics (e.g. Kruger, 1999); the 
tendency of individuals to be too optimistic about their own future prospects (e.g., 
Weinstein, 1980); and the tendency of top managers to be highly likely to face low-
frequency and noisy feedback – which are key predictors of biased decision making 
(e.g., Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Top-level executive decisions such as large-scale 
investments, merger agreements, or capital restructuring are relatively rare events in the 
life of one company, and each project has many distinct features which make 
comparison to past experiences difficult (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). From this 
perspective, the oil managers that ex post seemed to have overinvested in capital 
expenditures in the mid 1980s may have simply suffered from the adverse 
consequences of inaccurate oil price forecasts in the context of long investment cycles 
that, once started, are hard to be stopped or reversed.   
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Finally, moving beyond the specific context of buyouts, this study may also lead 
to implications related to the broader question of why firms underperform. If the role of 
agency-theoretic arguments (combined with POE) in explaining firm underperformance 
are found to be limited in the context of buyouts, then these relationships should also be 
re-examined in a broader set of contexts in corporate governance, such as bankruptcies.  
7.2.2. Implications for Practice 
The present study also evidences implications to practitioners in strategic 
management. In describing ways in which academic researchers may successfully 
translate their work into articles that are relevant for managers, McGahan (2007) 
highlighted the value of showing that a widely used management practice violates 
important principles. This study on buyouts leads to the implication that PE buyouts 
may be difficult to reconcile with an important principle in strategic management, 
according to which a key component of a firm’s strategy is the economic logic of 
actions undertaken by management (e.g. Hambrick and Frederickson, 2005). 
Specifically, if little empirical support is found for Kaplan’s (2007) proposition on 
operational engineering, then buyout-related benefits are more likely to be purely 
financial rather than operational in line with Swensen (2000), potentially leading to the 
questioning of the economic logic of buyouts as a governance structure. Whereas 
operational engineering may lead to enhanced firm competitiveness, financial 
engineering in the form of more debt may not.  
A second implication from a practical perspective follows from an intriguing 
question, namely whether the operational improvements potentially associated with 
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buyouts can be obtained without taking the target private in the first place (Jensen, 
Kaplan, Ferenbach, Feldberg, Moon, Hoesterey, Davis and Jones, 2006). At the heart of 
this debate is the extent to which internal governance mechanisms may serve as 
substitutes to their external counterparts (e.g. Walsh and Seward, 1990). This is an 
intriguing question yet to be resolved from a practitioner’s perspective. 
Relatedly, a third practical implication concerns a closer examination of PE 
firms, which grew in importance rapidly as the buyout phenomenon disseminates 
throughout the US. Strategic management scholars may be interested in examining in 
PE firms the very same agency problems that some PE executives claim to solve in 
buyout targets. As noted, the relationship between general partners (GPs) and limited 
partners (LPs) is prone to severe agency problems.  Poorly structured PE arrangements 
often produce misaligned interests between GPs and LPs. As an example, some GPs 
may receive carried interests of 20% of partnership profits regardless of buyout 
performance, creating the incentive to increase buyout volume without worrying about 
returns (e.g. Swensen, 2000). It is thus not surprising to note that the relationship 
between GPs and LPs remains a high-potential domain for scholars interested in 
corporate governance. 
7.3. Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research  
This research is also associated with limitations that future research may 
address. A first limitation as well as opportunity for future research relates to my 
dataset. As noted, the data are time-varying and target-level. Yet, it is possible that 
additional antecedents of buyout activity may also involve dyad-level (buyout target 
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and acquirer) elements. In these cases, other research methods such as state-based 
sampling (e.g., Folta and O’Brien, 2004) are more adequate. 
A second limitation as well as opportunity also relates to the fact that my data 
source includes listed (publicly-traded) whole-firms only, given the agency-theoretic 
backdrop of this study. Whereas I focus on going-private (public to private) buyouts, 
buyout transactions are also a common practice in private firms. This limits the 
generalizability of my results. Indeed, for some types of private firms such as family 
businesses, buyouts are sometimes the most viable path for a succession plan leading to 
a change in ownership (Rickertsen, 2001). Further, the characteristics of private-to-
private buyouts are quite unique (e.g., Malone, 1989; Zahra, 1995). Future research 
may therefore examine the antecedents of buyouts of privately-held firms. This 
research opportunity could requite primary data sources. 
A third potential avenue for future research follows from a key assumption that 
underlies the present work, namely that buyout firms would actively seek candidate 
targets with high potential for operational engineering. A related, equally intriguing 
question relates to what actually happens to operations in the buyout target after the 
transaction is complete. Whereas this question is beyond the scope of the present study 
which focuses on the antecedents of buyouts, the question on the consequences of 
buyouts is also of high importance to corporate governance scholars. Specifically, an 
alternative way to test Kaplan’s (2007) proposition would be to focus on post-buyout 
operations. This research opportunity would necessitate data sources that span pre- and 
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post-buyout observations, which could be challenging given the nature of going-private 
transactions.  
Finally, corporate governance researchers interested in buyouts might also 
consider the development of new theory, if a combination of the traditional agency-
theoretic arguments and the more recent POE proposition fails to be associated with 
strong empirical support. A common theme that emerged anecdotally is how partners at 
buyout firms may behave opportunistically when screening and chasing potential 
buyout targets. If this is valid, then a social networks perspective might be useful in 
further examining buyout activity. Whereas economic drivers have traditionally been 
used to explain buyout activity in the extant literature, little research has considered 
firms’ embeddedness in social and economic contexts that may enable buyouts. In a 
broader context, some researchers (e.g., Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild and Beckman, 
1998) have examined the role of social context and organizational embeddedness in 
M&A transactions. These theoretical considerations have yet to be extended to the 
buyouts literature. 
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Table 1. 1980s’ LBOs: Theoretical Antecedents and Empirical Evidence 
 
Antecedent and Key 
Contribution Underlying Mechanism  Empirical Evidence 
Agency costs of free 
cash flows (Jensen, 
1986; 1989; 1991; 
1993) 
• In line with FCF theory, Jensen 
(1986, 1989, 1991, 1993) argues that 
high cash flows enable agents to 
invest in value-destroying projects 
• Companies that invest in value-
destroying projects will be punished 
in capital markets and become 
buyout targets 
• Singh (1990) found that 
cash flow to net sales is 
a predictor of buyout 
activity in a sample of 
1980s’ MBOs 
Unsuccessful 
diversification 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 
1990) 
• In line with agency theory, unrelated 
diversification provides agents with 
an avenue for empire-building 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981) 
• Shareholder disappointment with 
conglomerates led to a shift away 
from unsuccessful diversification 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1990) 
• Opler and Titman (1993) 
found evidence in partial 
support of this argument 
Firm undervaluation 
(Singh, 1990; Fox 
and Marcus, 1992; 
Donaldson, 1994) 
• In line with agency theory and the 
market for corporate control (e.g., 
Fama, 1980), agents engage in 
behavior that decreases firm value 
• Institutional shareholders expose 
undervalued firms, turning these into 
buyout targets 
• Opler and Titman (1993) 
found evidence in partial 
support of this argument 
in a study of 1980s’ 
LBOs 
Free cash flows and 
undervaluation 
(Opler and Titman, 
1993) 
• The FCF argument interacts with the 
undervaluation argument to explain 
buyout activity 
• Opler and Titman (1993) 
found evidence in partial 
support of this argument 
in a study of 1980s’ 
LBOs 
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Table 2. Comparison of this Study with Prior Work 
 
 Singh (1990)  Opler and Titman (1993)  This Study 
Data Sources 
• Buyouts: SEC files 
and private lists 
from two 
investment banks 
• Transaction-level 
data: Wall Street 
Journal Index and 
SEC filings  
• Target financials: 
Compustat 
• Buyouts: ADP 
M&A, S&P News, 
Dow Jones Broad 
Tape, and private 
list from Bronwyn 
Hall 
• Target financials: 
Compustat 
• Diversification data: 
TRINET 
• Buyouts: SDC 
• Target financials: 
Compustat 
• Diversification data: 
Compustat II 
(Business 
Segments) 
• Board-level 
variables: IRRC 
# of 
Observations 
• 65 listed firms 
undergoing an 
MBO (management 
buyout) 
• 130 control firms 
• 170 listed firms 
undergoing an LBO 
(leveraged buyout) 
• 3320 control firms 
• 65 listed firms 
undergoing LBO 
• 1459 firms in total 
• 8631 firm-years in 
total (buyout firms 
plus control firms) 
Time Period • 1980-1987 • 1980-1990 • 1998-2007 
Methodology • Logistic regression • Logistic regression • Cox regression 
Control for 
Industry 
• Matched sample: 2 
control firms for 
each buyout firm 
• Entire universe of 
firms with available 
data 
• Entire universe of 
firms with available 
data 
Control for 
Competing 
Risks 
• No • No • Yes 
Agency  
Measures • Proxy measures • Proxy measures • Direct measures 
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Table 3. Buyout Cycles 
 
Year 
All Buyout 
Transactions 
Divestiture 
Buyouts 
Private-to-Private 
Buyouts 
Public-to-Private 
Buyouts 
#  Deals 
[-] 
Avg. Value 
[$ millions] 
#  Deals 
[-] 
Avg. Value 
[$ millions] 
#  Deals 
[-] 
Avg. Value 
[$ millions] 
#  Deals 
[-] 
Avg. Value 
[$ millions] 
1981 4 393 1 NA 3 393 - 0 
1982 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 
1983 1 442 - 0 1 442 - 0 
1984 8 423 - 0 8 423 - 0 
1985 1 116 1 116 - 0 - 0 
1986 3 259 1 NA 1 35 1 484 
1987 3 116 2 116 - 0 1 NA 
1988 10 338 1 NA 4 211 5 388 
1989 7 7,848 1 NA 3 75 3 10,439 
1990 6 1,183 3 843 2 NA 1 1,863 
1991 10 260 4 58 6 530 - 0 
1992 13 69 5 37 8 94 - 0 
1993 10 94 4 159 5 39 1 10 
1994 18 452 8 598 9 160 1 NA 
1995 23 467 11 98 11 70 1 4,643 
1996 22 211 6 201 14 98 2 569 
1997 38 223 12 209 20 177 6 292 
1998 40 285 15 202 21 355 4 368 
1999 42 290 16 272 20 327 6 261 
2000 67 197 22 228 39 133 6 250 
2001 22 127 9 209 12 15 1 77 
2002 28 292 16 386 10 81 2 23 
2003 23 786 9 1,116 13 320 1 342 
2004 96 420 43 346 46 377 7 718 
2005 165 312 62 294 95 244 8 502 
2006 278 1,343 95 756 167 303 16 3,716 
2007 368 2,511 128 741 205 316 35 6,301 
2008 261 860 86 441 164 81 11 2,981 
Total 1,567 1,001 561 477 887 246 119 3,159 
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Table 4. Sample Description by Industrial Sector 
 
2-digit SIC Description Number of  Buyouts 
13 Oil and gas extraction  1 
20 Food and kindred products  2 
23 Apparel and other textile products  1 
27 Printing and publishing  2 
28 Chemicals and allied products  2 
33 Primary metal industries  1 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment  1 
36  Electrical and electronic equipment  5 
37  Transportation equipment  3 
38  Instruments and related products  3 
39  Miscellaneous manufacturing industries  1 
48  Communications  2 
49  Electric, gas, and sanitary services  2 
50  Wholesale trade of durable goods  2 
51  Wholesale trade of nondurable goods  1 
53  General merchandise stores  3 
54  Food stores  1 
56  Apparel and accessory stores  1 
57  Furniture, home furnishings and equipment stores  1 
58  Eating and drinking places  2 
59  Miscellaneous retail  6 
70  Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other lodging 2 
73 Business services  9 
75 Automotive repair, services, and parking  1 
80 Health services  4 
82 Educational services  2 
87 Engineering and management services  4 
Total  65 
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Table 5. Sample Description by Year 
 
Year Number of  Buyouts 
1998 0 
1999 4 
2000 8 
2001 1 
2002 1 
2003 1 
2004 3 
2005 5 
2006 12 
2007 30 
Total 65 
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Table 6. Variables and Measures 
 
Variable Type of Variable Measure 
Buyout Dependent 
Probability of a buyout (by any type of buyout firm) 
occurring at time t, given that the event has not occurred 
prior to that instant 
Board 
Independence Independent 
Percentage of board members that are independent and 
therefore not affiliated directors according to the IRRC 
CEO Duality  Independent Dummy variable coded as one if the firm’s CEO also 
serves as chairperson at the same firm 
Insider Equity 
Ownership Independent 
Percentage of equity controlled by the firms’ directors and 
officers as provided by the IRRC 
Asset 
Inefficiency Independent 
Construct obtained from factor analysis of four inefficiency 
measures: liquidity inefficiency (cash and equivalents #1 
scaled by net sales #12); working capital inefficiency 
(working capital #179 scaled by net sales #12); fixed-asset 
inefficiency (property, plant and equipment #7 scaled by 
net sales #12); and total asset inefficiency (total assets #6 
scaled by net sales #12). The factor analysis yielded a one-
factor weighted average with an eigenvalue of 3.38 that 
explained 84.5% of total variance 
Free Cash Flow  Control 
Free cash flow divided by firm sales. Free cash flow is 
operating income before depreciation (#13), minus total 
income taxes (#16), minus the change in deferred taxes 
from the previous year to the current year (change in #35), 
minus gross interest expenses on short and long-term debt 
(#15), minus the total amount of preferred dividend 
requirement on cumulative preferred stock and dividends 
paid on non-cumulative preferred stock (#19), minus the 
total dollar amount of dividends declared on common stock 
(#21) 
Unrelated 
Diversification Control 
Jacquemin-Berry entropy measure of diversification at the 
2-digit SIC level 
Tobin’s Q Control 
Market value divided by book value of assets. Market value 
is the firm’s market value of common stock (#24 * #25), 
plus book value of assets (#6), less book value of common 
equity (#60), less deferred taxes on the balance sheet (#74) 
Leverage  Control Total debt (#9 plus #34) divided by total equity (#216) 
Taxes  Control Income tax expenses (#16) scaled by net sales (#12) 
Year Fixed 
Effects Control 
Dummy variables that equal one if the buyout was 
completed in the given year, and zero otherwise 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Control 
Dummy variables that equal one if the buyout was 
completed in the given 2-digit SIC industrial sector, and 
zero otherwise 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Independent 
Variables Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1. Buyout .008 .086          
2. Free cash 
flow .051 1.936 .00         
3. Unrelated 
diversification  .145 .242 -.01 .01        
4. Tobin’s Q 2.107 1.701 -.03* -.01 -.14***       
5. Leverage  .775 3.151 -.01 .00 .05*** -.01      
6. Taxes .032 .084 .01 -.01 -.02† .17*** -.02     
7. Board 
independence 
 
67.239 16.754 .00 -.01 .07*** -.04*** .00 .00 
 
 
 
  
8. CEO duality .320 .466 .02 -.01 -.11*** .02* -.04** .00 -.11***   
9. Insider 
equity 
ownership 
10.733 14.342 .01 -.02† -.06*** .01 .02† -.02† -.41*** .04***  
10. Asset 
inefficiency 2.562 6.782 .00 -.79
***
 -.03** .04** .00 -.09*** .01 -.01 .00 
 
n = 8631. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 8. Main Results of Cox Regression 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  2.235 (2.295) 
2.481 
(2.355) 
2.029 
(2.335) 
2.306 
(2.315) 
2.627 
(2.357) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.076 
(.144) 
.067 
(.146) 
.069 
(.146) 
.082 
(.147) 
.064 
(.145) 
Tobin’s Q  -1.462
***
 
(.368) 
-1.493*** 
(.377) 
-1.532*** 
(.378) 
-1.531*** 
(.380) 
-1.494*** 
(.378) 
Leverage  -.029 (.129) 
-.031 
(.128) 
-.026 
(.129) 
-.033 
(.129) 
-.029 
(.130) 
Taxes .337 (.227) 
.370 
(.251) 
.436† 
(.253) 
.407 
(.251) 
.355 
(.249) 
Year fixed effects 30.21*** 28.14*** 28.69*** 28.55*** 28.56*** 
Industry fixed effects 64.81*** 63.79*** 64.03*** 64.50*** 64.21*** 
Board independence  --- .095 (.154) 
.089 
(.154) 
.088 
(.154) 
.096 
(.154) 
CEO duality --- .023 (.127) 
.027 
(.127) 
.038 
(.128) 
.026 
(.127) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.126 
(.123) 
.140 
(.125) 
.119 
(.123) 
.092 
(.131) 
Asset inefficiency --- -.059 (.479) 
-.226 
(.494) 
-.135 
(.493) 
-.068 
(.456) 
Asset inefficiency * 
board independence --- --- 
-.484* 
(.244) --- --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
CEO duality --- --- --- 
.402 
(.353) --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
-.358 
(.409) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -376.03 -375.48 -373.94 -374.87 -375.05 
Model χ 2 131.95*** 133.03*** 136.11*** 134.26*** 133.89*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 9. Robustness: Two-Stage Cox Regression (Selection Correction) 
 
Independent 
Variables Stage I 
Stage II: 
Model I 
(Controls) 
Stage II: 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Stage II: 
Model III 
(H4) 
Stage II: 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Stage II: 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  -.010 (.225) 
2.233 
(2.294) 
2.436 
(2.307) 
2.037 
(2.333) 
2.297 
(2.314) 
2.619 
(2.353) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.124*** 
(.035) 
.056 
(.151) 
.049 
(.152) 
.051 
(.152) 
.063 
(.153) 
.044 
(.151) 
Tobin’s Q  -.235
***
 
(.357) 
-1.431*** 
(.373) 
-1.442*** 
(.381) 
-1.504*** 
(.353) 
-1.501*** 
(.385) 
-1.461*** 
(.383) 
Leverage  -.024 (.033) 
-.021 
(.129) 
-.025 
(.127) 
-.019 
(.128) 
-.026 
(.128) 
-.021 
(.129) 
Taxes .051
*
 
(.023) 
.335 
(.227) 
.333 
(.250) 
.436† 
(.252) 
.406 
(.249) 
.352 
(.249) 
Lambda (λ) --- .014 (.030) 
.013 
(.030) 
.013 
(.031) 
.014 
(.031) 
.015 
(.031) 
Year fixed  
effects 1933.31
***
 4.71 4.58 4.78 4.56 4.56 
Industry fixed 
effects 79.50
***
 64.78*** 63.70*** 63.99*** 64.43*** 64.11*** 
Board 
independence  --- --- 
.095 
(.154) 
.090 
(.154) 
.089 
(.154) 
.098 
(.159) 
CEO duality --- --- .026 (.127) 
.028 
(.127) 
.039 
(.128) 
.027 
(.127) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- --- 
.124 
(.124) 
.138 
(.126) 
.116 
(.123) 
.086 
(.133) 
Asset 
inefficiency --- --- 
-.062 
(.479) 
-.231 
(.493) 
-.141 
(.493) 
-.074 
(.456) 
Asset 
inefficiency * 
board 
independence 
--- --- --- 
-.482* 
(.244) --- --- 
Asset 
inefficiency * 
CEO duality 
--- --- --- --- 
.404 
(.353) --- 
Asset 
inefficiency * 
insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- --- 
-.369 
(.415) 
Log Likelihood, 
L(β) -10787.72 -375.91 -375.37 -373.85 -374.77 -375.05 
Model χ 2 1850.98*** 132.18*** 133.26*** 136.30*** 134.47*** 133.89*** 
Number of 
observations 37939 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 8422 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of 
events 1459 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 10. Robustness: Cox Regression with Employee Inefficiency 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  2.235 (2.295) 
2.449 
(2.361) 
2.416 
(2.360) 
2.435 
(2.358) 
2.502 
(2.372) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.076 
(.144) 
.068 
(.146) 
.070 
(.146) 
.068 
(.146) 
.069 
(.146) 
Tobin’s Q  -1.462
***
 
(.368) 
-1.496*** 
(.378) 
-1.494*** 
(.377) 
-1.501*** 
(.378) 
-1.511*** 
(.378) 
Leverage  -.029 (.129) 
-.031 
(.128) 
-.031 
(.128) 
-.032 
(.128) 
-.029 
(.131) 
Taxes .337 (.227) 
.369 
(.251) 
.365 
(.241) 
.369 
(.251) 
.372 
(.252) 
Year fixed effects 30.21*** 28.08*** 27.88*** 28.02*** 27.47*** 
Industry fixed effects 64.81*** 54.76*** 55.09*** 54.56*** 56.43*** 
Board independence  --- .097 (.154) 
.089 
(.157) 
.097 
(.158) 
.085 
(.155) 
CEO duality --- .024 (.127) 
.024 
(.128) 
.016 
(.129) 
.020 
(.127) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.126 
(.124) 
.127 
(.123) 
.128 
(.123) 
.131 
(.123) 
Asset inefficiency --- -.065 (.481) 
-.066 
(.482) 
-.062 
(.481) 
-.065 
(.482) 
Employee inefficiency --- .024 (.159) 
.046 
(.176) 
.055 
(.129) 
.060 
(.144) 
Employee inefficiency * 
board independence --- --- 
-.037 
(.136) --- --- 
Employee inefficiency * 
CEO duality --- --- --- 
.289 
(.820) --- 
Employee inefficiency * 
insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
.178 
(.174) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -376.03 -375.47 -375.44 -375.35 -374.94 
Model χ 2 131.95*** 133.06*** 133.13*** 133.24*** 134.13*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 11. Robustness: Cox Regression with Overheads Inefficiency 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  2.235 (2.295) 
2.817 
(2.285) 
2.782 
(2.284) 
2.798 
(2.283) 
2.856 
(2.302) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.076 
(.144) 
.098 
(.148) 
.100 
(.148) 
.098 
(.148) 
.098 
(.148) 
Tobin’s Q  -1.462
***
 
(.368) 
-1.581*** 
(.383) 
-1.579*** 
(.382) 
-1.586*** 
(.383) 
-1.591*** 
(.383) 
Leverage  -.029 (.129) 
-.025 
(.132) 
-.024 
(.132) 
-.025 
(.131) 
-.022 
(.135) 
Taxes .337 (.227) 
.449† 
(.246) 
.445† 
(.245) 
.449† 
(.245) 
.449† 
(.248) 
Year fixed effects 30.21*** 27.98*** 27.76*** 27.88*** 27.36*** 
Industry fixed effects 64.81*** 56.81*** 57.01*** 56.55*** 58.28*** 
Board independence  --- .084 (.155) 
.076 
(.157) 
.086 
(.155) 
.074 
(.155) 
CEO duality --- .017 (.127) 
.017 
(.128) 
.008 
(.122) 
.014 
(.127) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.121 
(.125) 
.122 
(.125) 
.123 
(.125) 
.125 
(.124) 
Asset inefficiency --- -.291 (.517) 
-.293 
(.516) 
-.288 
(.517) 
-.283 
(.518) 
Employee inefficiency --- .007 (.158) 
.032 
(.177) 
.052 
(.188) 
.045 
(.146) 
Overheads inefficiency --- .370 (.238) 
.371 
(.238) 
.371 
(.239) 
.359 
(.239) 
Overheads inefficiency 
* board independence --- --- 
.039 
(.136) --- --- 
Overheads inefficiency 
* CEO duality --- --- --- 
.055 
(.130) --- 
Overheads inefficiency 
* insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
-.169 
(.177) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -376.03 -374.32 -374.28 -374.24 -373.86 
Model χ 2 131.95*** 135.36*** 135.44*** 135.54*** 136.29*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 12. Robustness: Cox Regression with Dry Powder and Credit Spread 
 
Independent Variables 
Model I 
(Controls with 
year fixed 
effects) 
Model II 
(Controls with 
dry powder and 
credit spread) 
Model III 
(H1-H3 with 
year fixed 
effects) 
Model IV 
(H1-H3 with 
dry powder and 
credit spread) 
Free cash flow  2.235 (2.295) 
2.201 
(2.273) 
2.481 
(2.355) 
2.467 
(2.342) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.076 
(.144) 
.079 
(.144) 
.067 
(.146) 
.074 
(.145) 
Tobin’s Q  -1.462
***
 
(.368) 
-1.490*** 
(.369) 
-1.493*** 
(.377) 
-1.525*** 
(.379) 
Leverage  -.029 (.129) 
-.019 
(.132) 
-.031 
(.128) 
-.019 
(.132) 
Taxes .337 (.227) 
.348 
(.225) 
.370 
(.251) 
.393 
(.251) 
Year fixed effects 30.21*** --- 28.14*** --- 
Dry powder  --- .007
**
 
(.002) --- 
.007** 
(.002) 
Credit Spread --- -1.096
*
 
(.477) --- 
-1.092* 
(.476) 
Industry fixed effects 64.81*** 57.27*** 63.79*** 56.92*** 
Board independence  --- --- .095 (.154) 
.085 
(.152) 
CEO duality --- --- .023 (.127) 
.037 
(.127) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- --- 
.126 
(.123) 
.121 
(.123) 
Asset inefficiency --- --- -.059 (.479) 
-.119 
(.483) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -376.03 -379.89 -375.48 -379.35 
Model χ 2 131.95*** 124.22*** 133.03*** 125.31*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 13. Robustness: Cox Regressions without Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  -.001 (.233) 
-.206 
(.572) 
-.302 
(.606) 
-.244 
(.833) 
-.234 
(.771) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
-.029 
(.234) 
-.021 
(.134) 
-.033 
(.135) 
-.018 
(.134) 
-.016 
(.135) 
Tobin’s Q  -.954
**
 
(.307) 
-.978** 
(.309) 
-1.019*** 
(.312) 
-.998** 
(.314) 
-.969** 
(.309) 
Leverage  -.069 (.118) 
-.070 
(.117) 
-.069 
(.121) 
-.070 
(.117) 
-.070 
(.118) 
Taxes .091 (.078) 
.105 
(.079) 
.195 
(.124) 
.136 
(.132) 
.077 
(.103) 
Year fixed effects 34.87*** 33.07*** 32.91*** 33.09*** 33.22*** 
Board independence  --- -.015 (.147) 
-.014 
(.146) 
.017 
(.147) 
-.017 
(.137) 
CEO duality --- .081 (.121) 
.082 
(.121) 
.090 
(.122) 
.081 
(.121) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.148 
(.112) 
.152 
(.112) 
.147 
(.112) 
.137 
(.116) 
Asset inefficiency --- -.161 (.378) 
-.317 
(.409) 
-.232 
(.418) 
-.123 
(.375) 
Asset inefficiency * 
board independence --- --- 
-.466* 
(.234) --- --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
CEO duality --- --- --- 
.230 
(.328) --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
-.147 
(.318) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -415.13 -413.71 -412.14 -413.44 -413.59 
Model χ 2 53.73*** 56.59*** 59.72*** 57.13*** 56.82*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 14: Robustness: Correlation Table for Asset Inefficiency Measures 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1. Free cash flows 
        
2. Board 
independence -.01        
3. Insider equity 
ownership -.02
†
 -.41*** 
      
4. CEO duality -.01 -.11*** .04*** 
     
5. Asset 
inefficiency (POE) -.79
***
 .01 .00 -.01 
    
6. Cash 
inefficiency -.84
***
 .01 .02 .01 .96*** 
   
7. Working capital 
inefficiency -.82
***
 .00 .02* .02 .93*** .99*** 
  
8. Fixed-asset 
inefficiency -.82
***
 .03** -.05*** -.01 .72*** .68*** .64*** 
 
9. Total-asset 
inefficiency -.82
***
 .01 -.01 -.01 .98*** .94*** .92*** .81*** 
 
n = 8631. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 15. Robustness: Cox Regression with Liquidity Inefficiency 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  2.235 (2.295) 
.715 
(2.599) 
.066 
(2.524) 
.227 
(2.067) 
-.010 
(2.417) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.076 
(.144) 
.044 
(.145) 
.052 
(.145) 
.050 
(.146) 
.049 
(.145) 
Tobin’s Q  -1.462
***
 
(.368) 
-1.441*** 
(.379) 
-1.466*** 
(.375) 
-1.445*** 
(.378) 
-1.459*** 
(.376) 
Leverage  -.029 (.129) 
-.015 
(.121) 
-.001 
(.120) 
-.011 
(.121) 
-.001 
(.119) 
Taxes .337 (.227) 
.556* 
(.261) 
.618** 
(.250) 
.575* 
(.252) 
.646 
(.244) 
Year fixed effects 30.21*** 28.04*** 28.66*** 28.30*** 28.94*** 
Industry fixed effects 64.81*** 60.45*** 61.42*** 60.99*** 62.02*** 
Board independence  --- .103 (.154) 
.114 
(.155) 
.102 
(.154) 
.016 
(.158) 
CEO duality --- .035 (.127) 
.026 
(.127) 
.079 
(.136) 
.018 
(.128) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.126 
(.122) 
.244† 
(.133) 
.126 
(.122) 
.136 
(.123) 
Liquidity inefficiency --- -2.013
†
 
(1.022) 
-2.208* 
(1.095) 
-2.122† 
(1.143) 
-1.989† 
(1.088) 
Liquidity inefficiency * 
board independence --- --- 
1.233† 
(.669) --- --- 
Liquidity inefficiency * 
CEO duality --- --- --- 
.632 
(.678) --- 
Liquidity inefficiency * 
insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
-1.186* 
(.510) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -376.03 -373.62 -372.55 -373.27 -371.41 
Model χ 2 131.95*** 136.76*** 138.90*** 137.46*** 141.18*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 16. Robustness: Cox Regression with Working Capital Inefficiency 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  2.235 (2.295) 
.324 
(2.332) 
-.694 
(1.223) 
.372 
(2.644) 
-.585 
(1.385) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.076 
(.144) 
.038 
(.146) 
.052 
(.146) 
.040 
(.146) 
.041 
(.146) 
Tobin’s Q  -1.462
***
 
(.368) 
-1.450*** 
(.373) 
-1.494*** 
(.358) 
-1.469*** 
(.380) 
-1.469*** 
(.359) 
Leverage  -.029 (.129) 
-.007 
(.109) 
-.010 
(.111) 
-.010 
(.110) 
-.001 
(.110) 
Taxes .337 (.227) 
.577* 
(.224) 
.641*** 
(.174) 
.550* 
(.243) 
.633** 
(.189) 
Year fixed effects 30.21*** 27.60*** 27.12*** 27.68*** 28.00*** 
Industry fixed effects 64.81*** 57.92*** 57.53*** 57.29*** 59.36*** 
Board independence  --- .096 (.154) 
.109 
(.155) 
.093 
(.154) 
.030 
(.161) 
CEO duality --- .045 (.127) 
.041 
(.127) 
.022 
(.148) 
.039 
(.127) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.148 
(.123) 
.262* 
(.126) 
.146 
(.123) 
.146 
(.122) 
Working capital 
inefficiency --- 
-2.852** 
(.923) 
-2.789** 
(.853) 
-2.711** 
(.903) 
-2.610** 
(.926) 
Working capital 
inefficiency * board 
independence 
--- --- 
1.357* 
(.588) --- --- 
Working capital 
inefficiency * CEO 
duality 
--- --- --- 
-.618 
(.661) --- 
Working capital 
inefficiency * insider 
equity ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
-.702 
(.612) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -376.03 -370.96 -369.12 -370.55 -370.43 
Model χ 2 131.95*** 142.09*** 145.77*** 142.91*** 143.15*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 17. Robustness: Cox Regression with Fixed-Asset Inefficiency 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  2.235 (2.295) 
1.427 
(2.001) 
1.402 
(2.129) 
1.484 
(2.200) 
1.162 
(2.266) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.076 
(.144) 
.084 
(.126) 
.085 
(.146) 
.075 
(.146) 
.097 
(.146) 
Tobin’s Q  -1.462
***
 
(.368) 
-1.393*** 
(.362) 
-1.392*** 
(.365) 
-1.449*** 
(.376) 
-1.456*** 
(.377) 
Leverage  -.029 (.129) 
-.041 
(.122) 
-.039 
(.124) 
-.052 
(.116) 
-.036 
(.121) 
Taxes .337 (.227) 
.232 
(.201) 
.228 
(.211) 
.243 
(.221) 
.208 
(.231) 
Year fixed effects 30.21*** 29.75*** 29.91*** 29.49*** 28.67*** 
Industry fixed effects 64.81*** 65.27*** 64.90*** 62.22*** 54.14*** 
Board independence  --- .090 (.153) 
.089 
(.155) 
.096 
(.156) 
.053 
(.163) 
CEO duality --- .022 (.126) 
.021 
(.126) 
.049 
(.131) 
.024 
(.128) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.141 
(.124) 
.120 
(.132) 
.135 
(.124) 
.144 
(.126) 
Fixed-asset inefficiency --- .920
***
 
(.234) 
.889** 
(.247) 
.486 
(.439) 
.087 
(.543) 
Fixed-asset inefficiency 
* board independence --- --- 
-.155 
(.343) --- --- 
Fixed-asset inefficiency 
* CEO duality --- --- --- 
.376 
(.264) --- 
Fixed-asset inefficiency 
* insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
-.535* 
(.260) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -376.03 -371.32 -371.22 -369.90 -368.18 
Model χ 2 131.95*** 141.37*** 141.57*** 144.20*** 147.64*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 18. Robustness: Cox Regression with Total-Asset Inefficiency 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  2.235 (2.295) 
2.345 
(2.344) 
2.485 
(2.358) 
2.226 
(2.265) 
2.066 
(2.355) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.076 
(.144) 
.064 
(.146) 
.063 
(.144) 
.081 
(.147) 
.062 
(.148) 
Tobin’s Q  -1.462
***
 
(.368) 
-1.461*** 
(.381) 
-1.468*** 
(.381) 
-1.489*** 
(.382) 
-1.583*** 
(.385) 
Leverage  -.029 (.129) 
-.034 
(.127) 
-.032 
(.129) 
-.041 
(.125) 
-.024 
(.127) 
Taxes .337 (.227) 
.331 
(.249) 
.326 
(.248) 
.363 
(.245) 
.420 
(.257) 
Year fixed effects 30.21*** 28.06*** 28.55*** 28.35*** 28.17*** 
Industry fixed effects 64.81*** 63.96*** 64.51*** 64.61*** 62.68*** 
Board independence  --- .095 (.154) 
.097 
(.155) 
.082 
(.154) 
.089 
(.156) 
CEO duality --- .026 (.127) 
.027 
(.127) 
.047 
(.128) 
.038 
(.127) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.126 
(.124) 
.096 
(.128) 
.117 
(.123) 
.150 
(.126) 
Total-asset inefficiency --- .121 (.446) 
.083 
(.406) 
.082 
(.481) 
-.162 
(.519) 
Total-asset inefficiency 
* board independence --- --- 
-.327 
(.345) --- --- 
Total-asset inefficiency 
* CEO duality --- --- --- 
.424 
(.338) --- 
Total-asset inefficiency 
* insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
-.534* 
(.210) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -376.03 -375.46 -374.96 -374.70 -372.78 
Model χ 2 131.95*** 133.09*** 134.07*** 134.61*** 138.44*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 19. Robustness: Descriptives with FCF Adjusted for Capital Expenditures 
 
 
Independent 
Variables Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1. Buyout .008 .086          
2. Adjusted 
free cash flow -.030 2.101 .00         
3. Unrelated 
diversification  .145 .242 -.01 .01        
4. Tobin’s Q 2.107 1.701 -.01 -.01 -.14***       
5. Leverage  .775 3.151 .00 .00 .05*** -.01      
6. Taxes .032 .084 .01 -.01 -.02† .17*** -.02     
7. Board 
independence 
 
67.239 16.754 .00 -.01 .07*** -.04*** .00 .00 
 
 
 
  
8. CEO duality .320 .466 .02 -.01 -.11*** .02* -.04** .00 -.11***   
9. Insider 
equity 
ownership 
10.733 14.342 .01 -.02† -.06*** .01 .02† -.02† -.41*** .04***  
10. Asset 
inefficiency 2.562 6.782 .00 -.89
***
 -.03** .04** .00 -.09*** .01 -.01 .00 
 
 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects. 
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Table 20. Robustness: Cox Regressions with FCF Adjusted for Capital Expenditures 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Adjusted free cash flow  4.231 (2.581) 
4.476† 
(2.659) 
3.963 
(2.624) 
4.163 
(2.648) 
4.771† 
(2.686) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
.065 
(.144) 
.056 
(.146) 
.058 
(.147) 
.071 
(.147) 
.051 
(.144) 
Tobin’s Q  -1.567
***
 
(.373) 
-1.598*** 
(.354) 
-1.637*** 
(.386) 
-1.633*** 
(.382) 
-1.607*** 
(.385) 
Leverage  -.028 (.131) 
-.028 
(.129) 
-.022 
(.129) 
-.030 
(.129) 
-.027 
(.132) 
Taxes .523
*
 
(.252) 
.557* 
(.277) 
.613* 
(.277) 
.575* 
(.275) 
.553* 
(.277) 
Year fixed effects 30.25*** 28.24*** 28.83*** 28.57*** 28.70*** 
Industry fixed effects 65.48*** 64.57*** 64.86*** 65.15*** 64.99*** 
Board independence  --- .103 (.154) 
.096 
(.154) 
.095 
(.154) 
.106 
(.154) 
CEO duality --- .021 (.127) 
.025 
(.127) 
.034 
(.128) 
.024 
(.127) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.129 
(.123) 
.138 
(.125) 
.117 
(.123) 
.086 
(.132) 
Asset inefficiency --- -.067 (.482) 
-.222 
(.496) 
-.124 
(.492) 
-.078 
(.459) 
Asset inefficiency * 
board independence --- --- 
-.476† 
(.247) --- --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
CEO duality --- --- --- 
.367 
(.357) --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
-.397 
(.409) 
Log Likelihood, L(β) -375.08 -374.54 -373.09 -374.04 -374.00 
Model χ 2 133.84*** 134.93*** 137.83*** 135.94*** 136.01*** 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects.
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Table 21. Robustness: Logit Regressions 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  .361 (.936) 
.403 
(1.157) 
.110 
(.743) 
.388 
(1.039) 
.430 
(1.186) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
-.131 
(.131) 
-.113 
(.134) 
-.126 
(.137) 
-.110 
(.134) 
-.111 
(.137) 
Tobin’s Q  -.832
**
 
(.242) 
-.859** 
(.248) 
-.891*** 
(.255) 
-.871** 
(.253) 
-.857*** 
(.248) 
Leverage  -.103 (.071) 
-.091 
(.068) 
-.091 
(.074) 
-.088 
(.068) 
-.091 
(.068) 
Taxes .121 (.118) 
.147 
(.137) 
.231 
(.161) 
.174 
(.169) 
.144 
(.141) 
Board independence  --- .156 (.154) 
.152 
(.151) 
.154 
(.154) 
.155 
(.154) 
CEO duality --- .172 (.119) 
.174 
(.119) 
.180 
(.122) 
.173 
(.118) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.200* 
(.100) 
.196† 
(.101) 
.197† 
(.100) 
.196† 
(.096) 
Asset inefficiency --- -.199 (.376) 
-.355 
(.507) 
-.181 
(.485) 
-.173 
(.118) 
Asset inefficiency * 
board independence --- --- 
-.463† 
(.278) --- --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
CEO duality --- --- --- 
.208 
(.378) --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
-.054 
(.238) 
Wald χ 2 18.84*** 23.54*** 23.89*** 24.20*** 24.31*** 
Pseudo R2 .018 .025 .029 .026 .025 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects.
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Table 22. Robustness: Rare-Events Logit Regressions 
 
Independent Variables Model I (Controls) 
Model II 
(H1-H3) 
Model III 
(H4) 
Model IV 
(H5) 
Model V 
(H6) 
Free cash flow  -.449 (.936) 
-.285 
(1.157) 
-2.027** 
(.743) 
-.773 
(1.039) 
-.304 
(1.186) 
Unrelated 
diversification  
-.119 
(.131) 
-.099 
(.134) 
-.113 
(.137) 
-.093 
(.134) 
-.099 
(.137) 
Tobin’s Q  -.770
**
 
(.242) 
-.794** 
(.248) 
-.756** 
(.255) 
-.782** 
(.253) 
-.794** 
(.248) 
Leverage  -.162
*
 
(.071) 
-.142* 
(.068) 
-.146* 
(.074) 
-.136* 
(.068) 
-.141* 
(.068) 
Taxes .091 (.118) 
.101 
(.137) 
.095 
(.161) 
.091 
(.169) 
.093 
(.141) 
Board independence  --- .148 (.154) 
.139 
(.151) 
.142 
(.154) 
.149 
(.154) 
CEO duality --- .173 (.119) 
.177 
(.119) 
.184 
(.122) 
.173 
(.118) 
Insider equity 
ownership --- 
.216* 
(.100) 
.207* 
(.101) 
.212* 
(.100) 
.237* 
(.096) 
Asset inefficiency --- .054 (.376) 
.251 
(.507) 
.060 
(.485) 
.119 
(.389) 
Asset inefficiency * 
board independence --- --- 
-.534† 
(.278) --- --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
CEO duality --- --- --- 
.293 
(.378) --- 
Asset inefficiency * 
insider equity 
ownership 
--- --- --- --- 
.060 
(.238) 
Pseudo R2 .018 .025 .029 .026 .025 
Number of observations 8631 8631 8631 8631 8631 
Number of firms 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Number of events 65 65 65 65 65 
 
†
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Wald chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of equal year and industry effects.
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 Figure 1. Popular Press Coverage on Buyouts in the US 
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Figure 2. Popular Press Coverage on Buyouts in Europe 
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Figure 3. Selected US Buyout Firms 
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Figure 4. Empirical Model 
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Figure 5. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
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Figure 6. Trend Analysis of Agency Variables 
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Figure 7: Baseline Survival Function for Model III on Table 8 
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